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INTRODUCTION
"Land is the indispensable foundation of any human activity.
Without it, there can be no agriculture, no industry, no urban
settlement. The first task of a landless people is to provide this
foundation for its existence."
-Abraham Granovsky, Head oftheJewish National Fund, 1940
Israel's August 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip was an unusual
departure from the reparations scheme the Israeli and German governments
are credited with promulgating internationally.1 This rare instance of
restitution calls upon the Palestinian National Authority ("PNA") to
implement the Palestinian's globally recognized right of return.2 In order to
reconcile this right born of customary international law3 with the principles
I Elazar Barkan, Professor of History and Cultural Studies at Claremont Graduate University,
cites the compensation paid by Germans to Jews since 1952 as the starting point of recent developments
in national politics and international diplomacy regarding historical injustices. Her assertion can be
summarized with the following excerpt from her book:
The German-Jewish agreement... became the foundation for further reconciliation between
Germans and Jews, led to the rehabilitation of Germany, and contributed to the economic
survival of Israel. This was the moment at which the modern notion of restitution for
historical injustices was born.... The German reparations that followed the war became the
gauge for future restitution claims.
ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING HISTORICAL
INJUSTICES xxiv (Johns Hopkins Paperbacks ed., The Johns Hopkins University Press 2001) (2000).
2 During the 12th United Nations Seminar on the Question of Palestine, the General
Assembly's resolution 38/58 C ofDecember 13th, 1983, issued in accordance with the recommendations
ofthe International Conference on the Question ofPalestine, provided the following guideline (amongst
others) for future international peace conferences related to the Middle East: "(a) The attainment by the
Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right of return, the right to self-
determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine." U.N. Info. Sys. on the
Question of Palestine [UNISPAL], Div. for Palestinian Rights [DPR], Question of Palestine: LegalAspects,
112-13, U.N. Doc. 4 (Mar. 31, 1992), available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf
322aff38525617b006d88d7/ec6dd0bflD0344e1852561 le006d808d!OpenDocument.
3 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar ("Fourth
Geneva Coi.vention" of 1949), and the 1907 Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs
ofWar on Land and its annexed Regulations, together comprise what "is widely regarded as a codification
of customary international law" related to occupation of enemy territory in the course of war. Ardi
Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L LJ. 65, 66
(2003). In addition, the United Nations cited the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 as supplementary
support for the rules of customary international law regulating belligerent occupation during the 8th
United Nations Seminar on the Question of Palestine. UN Question of Palestine, supra note 2, at 42
(Mohammad Aziz Shukri, Israel's Policies and Practices in theArab Occupied Territories in the Light of Prevailing
International Law). Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits individual or mass
forcible transfers, and provisions of the Hague Regulations limiting occupation to the extent military
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of Islamic law adopted by the PNA, the individual property rights demanded
by many Palestinians may be compromised.
As with the Aborigines in Australia, the Native Americans and
Hawaiians in the United States, and the indigenous peoples of South
America, collective rights are an integral part of Islamic society in the Middle
East.4 Such communal social norms are reflected by limitations on
individual property rights, if any individual property rights exist at all.' Like
Native Hawaiians, many Islamic societies divided land into public and
private property (referred to as "crown" land in Hawaii, and "miri" in the
Islamic Land Code of the Ottoman Empire), the public practically eclipsing
the private since ultimate ownership of most of the land was vested in the
state.6 Similar notions of property rights amongst Aborigines, and amongst
the native populations of North and South America, also amount to
"possession" of land, but fall short of exclusive "title" to it.7
In Australia, Aboriginal divergence from the Western concepts of private
property adopted by the mostly sedentary Australian farmers and
businessmen stems from the Aborigines' distinct nomadic lifestyle, and their
shared use of Australian land for spiritual purposes.8 The High Court of
exigencies persist in the absence of a final political settlement, are most pertinent with respect to the
humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection ofCivilian persons
in the time of War, Aug. 12, 1949.
4 Seegenerally Barkan, supra note 1 (discussing the communal use and limited private ownership
of land by indigenous peoples in Australia and North and South America); Andrew Grossman, "Islamic
Land": Group Rights, National Identity and Law, 3 UCLA J. IsLAMic & NEAR E. L. 53 (2003-2004)
(discussing the rejection ofWesternjurisprudence by Islamic countries in the aftermath of WWII in favor
of a return to classical norms of Islamic law which historically limited the marketability of Middle
Eastern lands). While other groups, most notably tribes and clans throughout the African continent,
place a similar premium on group rights and the communal nature of title to land, a complete discussion
of parallel social norms across the globe is beyond the scope of this article. Jon D. Unruh, Land and
Property Rights in the Peace Process, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY, Jan. 2004,
httpV/www.beyondintractability.org/essay/Landtenure/ ?nid= 1231 (describing armed conflict, land
tenure, and property rights issues in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Central America).
s Global decolonization since WWII in countries that now constitute the Third World, and the
growing recognition of indigenous peoples' rights in the First World since the 1960's, gave rise to
demands for restitution by indigenous peoples that rarely translate into Western norms such as private
property rights. The United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations develops declarations
and resolutions to safeguard the rights of indigenous peoples with an "emphasis on the extra-monetary
values embedded in the relationship between the indigenous peoples and the land and the communal
character of these groups, including religious and cultural manifestations." Barkan, supra note 1, at 166.
6 Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law and The
Palestinion Landholder 1948-1967, 33 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 923, 933 (2001); Barkan, supra note 1, at
225-228.
7 Seegenerally Barkan, supra note 1.
8 Id. at 232-245.
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Australia recognized the potential for duplicity in native title to land amongst
various Aboriginal communities. As a result, the Court abstained from the
strict use of English common law to settle an Aboriginal land claim in Eddie
Mabo and Others v. The State of Queensland.9 In the same vein, Palestinians are
currently filing manifold land claims in Gaza chiefly based on native title
vested by Islamic law (Shari'a) codified during Ottoman rule. 10 As opposed
to the Western notion of separation of church and state, religion plays a
pivotal role in the social contract between many indigenous populations and
Islamic societies. For the Palestinians as well as the Aborigines, appeals to
classic Western norms, such as individual private property rights, seem
somewhat misguided. The Palestinians believe in the inalienability of
Islamic land outside the Muslim community, traditionally keeping the land
"in whole, as a trust to the Muslims."1
Since the Palestinian Lands Authority validates only those land claims
based on land registry records and private deeds," this article primarily
addresses property laws related to land registration in the Gaza Strip,
including (1) Islamic law in effect during the Ottoman Empire, (2) Western
jurisprudential concepts bolstered during the British Mandate period, (3)
Israeli military law enforced after the 1967 occupation, and (4) the return of
Islamic jurisprudence on the heels of Israeli disengagement in 2005.13
Palestinians have historically had little opportunity to register title to their
land. This situation is frustrated by the Palestinian people themselves who,
fearing exorbitant taxation by foreign authorities, often hid land transactions.
Beginning with the disorderly land registration process in effect during the
Ottoman Empire, the occupation most favorable to the Arab landholder in
Gaza yielded few viable records. The Ottomans eventually gave way to
increasingly hostile authorities who enacted onerous obstacles to Palestinian
9 Id.
10 Kedar, supra note 6, at 932-936.
" Excerpt from the recorded opinion of the Second Caliph, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, regarding the
conquest of Syria and Iraq, and the tradition. Grossman, supra note 4, at 58.
12 E.g., Sara el Deeb, With Israel Gone, Who Gets the Land (in Gaza)?, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 1,
2005, available at http'//www.standwithus.con/news-post.asp?NPI=475; Cynthia Johnston, In Gaza,
Palestinians Pitch Tents to Claim Land, HERALD NEWS DAILY, Oct. 18, 2005, available at
httpz//www.astandforjustice.org/2005/10/10-18-12.html.
13 Drawing on information from legal scholars and the International Commission ofJurists, the
United Nations prepared a chronology of the development of the Palestinian legal system from 1517 to
1999. U.N. Dep't of Political Affairs [DPA], Office of the Special Coordinator for the Middle East
Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestinian Liberation
Organization and the Palestinian Authority [UNSCO], Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip: Survey and State of the Development Effort, ANNEX 9: PALESTINIAN LEGAL SYS. DEv.-A
CHRONOLOGY (May 1999), available at http'//www.arts.mcgill.ca/programs/polisci/faculty/rexb/unsco-
ruleoflaw/a-nine.htmi [UN Rule of Law Development].
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land ownership and possession. By chronicling the erosion of Palestinian
property rights, it becomes apparent there is little ground on which
Palestinians petitioning for the return of their homes can stake a claim.
This conclusion is supported by the actions of the PNA immediately
after the 2005 withdrawal of Israeli troops. For instance, the PNA forged
ahead with the construction of public housing in the coastal strip despite
challenges from Palestinians with claims to land allocated for development. 4
The universal right of return safeguarded by international law, as
implemented by the PNA, is a qualified right. Although Palestinians as a
whole are entitled to return to Palestine, their individual property claims are
subject to the whim of PNA officials. Consequently, the Palestinians' well-
founded appeal to a right of return in the context of a group right seems ill-
founded in the context of individual rights. Therefore, landholders must
appeal to their respective governments for the safe keeping of individual
rights.
In the Gaza Strip, strict interpretation of Shari'a underscores Allah's
supreme ownership of all property, negating the potential for individual
ownership rights. Reconciling the right of return with Palestinian laws will
not occur until the Palestinian people cease to equate the right of return with
individual rights to restitution of private property. Unfortunate as this may
be, the influence of Western norms of secular governance are not at fault.
In fact, it is the normative result of fundamentalist Islam dominating the
forces of moderation and modernization in the cradle of humanity.
I. 1517-1917: THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
When the Ottoman Empire conquered Palestine in 1517, the Palestinian
population was predominantly comprised of illiterate peasants (fellaheen)
settled on land they had traditionally cultivated.'" Although title to the land
was vested in the state as trustee of the Muslim people, the fellaheen could
obtain use and possession rights in the land. 6 To avoid tithes levied by the
state treasury against farmers with individual land rights, the fellaheen
practiced a customary system of land tenure (musha') whereby entire villages
14 Johnston, supra note 12.
is Hala Fattah, The Forgotten History of the Palestinian Peasant: Examples fom Jerusalem and other
Districts of Palestine, JERUSALEMITES, Apr. 19, 1999,
http/www.jerusalemites.org/jerusalem/ottoman/3.htm. Dr. Fattah is a historian of the Arab provinces
of the Ottoman Empire.
16 George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 Am. U. L.
REV. 467, 492 (1994).
2006]
6 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:1
or communities held rights in the land.'7 In order to curb musha' tenure,
which accounted for as much as seventy percent of Palestinian land by the
end of the 19th century, the Ottoman Sultan initiated a legal reform
movement drawing on European Civil Law concepts.'i
A. The Influence of Islam Prior to Ottoman Legal Reform
The revelations of God (Allah in Islam) are the foundation of most
religious law. Accordingly, Islamic law (Shari'a) derives primarily from the
holy book (Qur'an) and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad
(Sunnah) 9 Hadiths recount the acts and sayings of the Prophet, and are,
therefore, an integral part of the Sunnah.20 Consensus (ima) and analogy
(qiyas) are secondary sources of Islamic law since they are not directly
derived from the Prophet.2'
While most scholars agree Islamic property law is based on some
variation of the concept thatAllah is the supreme owner of all lands and man
merely his trustee, they differ with respect to what rights men have as trustee
of Allah's land. How does man acquire divine property? Once acquired, to
what extent is the property his?
Dr. Jamal Badawi, a religious studies professor at Saint Mary's
University in Halifax, describes property rights in Islam in terms of three
levels subordinate to Allah's ultimate ownership.' Inaccessible property,
such as a galaxy, belongs to God, and property common to all societies, such
as an ocean, belongs to the entire human race. Within countries, however,
property belongs to the community at large. Whether individual ownership
17 Id. at 492-493.
Is Id.
19 The term Shari'a itselfderives from the verb shara'a, which relates to the idea of"spiritual law"
(Qur'an 5:48) and the "system of divine law;, way of belief and practice" (Qur'an 45:18). Although
inferences drawn by scholars (flqh) from the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad's life are sources of
Islamic law, mainstream Islam distinguishes between Shari'a and Jiqh. E.g. Sharia, WKIPEDIA,
http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia (last visited Sept. 23, 2006). In practice, "Shari'a controls the family
and property interests of Muslims in countries where personal law is determined by religion." Andrew
Grossman, Finding the Law: Islamic Law (Sharia), LLRX.coM, (Aug. 1, 2002),
http'//www.llrx con/features/islamiclaw.htm.
20 P. Nicholas Kourides, The Influence ofIslamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern Legal Systems:
The Formation and Binding Force of Contracts, 9:2 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 384, 397 (1970).
21 For a discussion of the sources of Islamic law, see, e.g., Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An
Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7J. IsLAMIC L. & CULTURE 27 (1996); Christopher Melchert, Islamic
Law, 23 OKLA. CITYU. L. REv. 901,905 (1998); Kourides, supra note 20, at 387-391; PeterJ. Riga, Islamic
Law and Modernity: Conflict and Evolution, 36 AMJ.JuRIS. 103, 104-06 (1991).
22 Jamal Badawi, Property Rights in Islam, ISLAMONLINE.NET, July 31, 2005,
http'//www.isamonline.net/englishfintroducingislam /Economics/article05.shtml.
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of property exists within the communal property category, sometimes called
"common land,"' is the source of much debate.
Strict construction of the Qur'an leaves little room for the legitimate
ownership of property by persons other than Allah. Allah is referred to as
"the owner of the entire universe," and "the domain of heavens and earth
and anything in-between" belong to him.24 Islamists further limit the
possibility of broad construction of divine laws by foreclosing man-made
laws and interpretations from consideration. Shari'a is considered a
complete body of laws, without any allowance for supplementation.
25
In spite of the tradition of strict construction, many Islamic law scholars
argue authority for looser constructions of Shari'a exists in the hadith quoting
the Prophet Muhammad as follows: "My nation cannot agree on an error. ,26
Liberal legal scholars also suggest Muslim societies currently believe
individual ownership of property exists in addition to divine ownership. As
noted by a lecturer in Islamic Law at the University of London, "[a]
distinction is indeed drawn between the rights of God (huquqAllah) and the
rights of men (huquq ibad), but most authorities would regard only property
rights as belonging essentially to the latter class....,,7
In Introducing Islamic Political Economy, Dr. Masudul Alam Choudhury
claims the Qur'an and Sunnah "emphasize the central need for guarantee and
protection of property rights or entitlement."28  During the Prophet
Muhammad's farewell pilgrimage, for instance, he declared: "Your lives and
your property shall be inviolate until you meet your Lord. The safety of
your lives and of your property shall be as inviolate as this holy day and holy
month."2 Rather than identifying Shari'a's unitary principles with limits on
individual rights, Dr. Choudhury justifies his beliefs with the Qur'an's
concept ofjustice (adl) in terms of balance. He explains that "because of the
unifying concept of social justice in Islamic political economy, the concept of
property rights must also invoke guarantee and protection of all forms of
property rights concerning human possession and welfare." 0 Human
23 Id.
24 Id. (quoting Aal-'Imran 3:26, and AI-Ma'idah 5:120).
25 Grossman, supra note 19; Sharia, supra note 19.
26 Consensus (ijma) is an additional source of Shari'a law. E.g. Sharia, supra note 19 (quoting the
Qur'an).
2 N.J. Coulson, The State and the Individual in Islamic Law, 6 INT'L&COMP. L.Q.49, 50 (1957).
28 Masadul Alam Choudhury, Introducing Islamic Political Economy, IBF NET; httpV//islamic-
finance.net/islamic%2Deconomy/chapl/chapl-4.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2006).
29 Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, Islamic Views on Property Rights, Economic Freedom, and Entrepreneurship:
Application to Iraq, MINARET OF FREEDOM INST., May 8, 2003,
http://www.minaret.org/slamic%2OViews%20on%20Property%2ORights.htm.
30 Choudhury, supra note 28 (emphasis added).
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possession and welfare relates to wealth (al-mal), which is considered a
necessity (al-dharuriyat) protected by Shari'a.
Shari'a does not explicitly forbid the individual acquisition of property
and wealth; it merely prohibits the monopolization of necessities.32
According to the following contention of Dr. Badawi, the Qur'an itself gives
credence to the notion that Allah's property rights are not exclusive:
God tells the Prophet Muhammad what means: [Take from their
property charity]. In this verse, God uses the term "their property,"
showing that there is no contradiction between God's ultimate
ownership to the universe and our right as humans to own within
the restrictions that God has provided (citation omitted).33
Whether a person's property rights in Islam are communal or individual,
they exist by virtue of Islamic law or personal efforts?4 Islamic law, such as
the law of inheritance, explicitly provides many legal bases for acquiring
property in lands under Muslim governance (dar al-Islam). Dishonesty,
however, precludes the legal acquisition of property. The Prophet
Muhammad addressed this issue in his farewell pilgrimage when he warned,
"nothing shall be legitimate to a Muslim which belongs to a fellow Muslim
unless it was given freely and willingly." 35  Illegitimate practices include
fraudulent means of obtaining property, such as theft, or of obtaining a
person's consent to the taking of their property, such as bribery.36
31 Punishments (hudud) are enforced to protect and secure a person's necessities (al-dharuriyat)
which include: belief(deen), life (an-nafts), intellect (al-'aqil), wealth (al-mal), and family and lineage (an-
nasil). Salem AI-Hasi, ISLAMONLINE.NET, Sept. 9, 2002, http'//www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?
cid= 1123996015694&pagename = IslamOnline-English-AAbout_Islam/AskAboutlslamE/Ask
AboutlslamE (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
32 IOL Team, Freedom of Economic Activity, ISLAMONLINE.NET, Aug. 14, 2003,
http'//www.islamonline.net/english/introducingislamEconomics/article1 .shtml; see also Badawi, supra
note 22 ("There is a rule in Islamic law that says: 'Private harm could be tolerated if it were necessary to
prevent greater harm than would affect a larger number of people or the public at large'"); see also Imad-
ad-Dean Ahmad, Islam and Markets, MINARET OF FREEDOM INSTITUTE,
http://www.minaret.org/acton.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2006) ("Rather than modify the concept of
property, the Qur'an specifies the terms for its wholesome and just enjoyment and employment").
33 Badawi, supra note 22.
34 If a person is to fulfill their duties (such as paying religious tithe) as Allah's agent on earth
(khalifah), he/she must have some rights in Allah's property. See generally id. (discussing methods of
acquiring property in Islamic law).
35 Muslim Student Association, New Mexico State University, The Last Sermon of the Prophet
Muhammad, http//web.nmsu.edu/-msa/articlel3.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2007).
36 For an in depth analysis of the sources of Islamic law that provide the rules binding Muslims,
see Kourides, supra note 20, at 394-97.
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Personal efforts, including working for a salary, hunting, fishing, or
commercial operations, provide additional legal means of obtaining property
in dar al-Islam. The Qur'an stipulates, in pertinent part, that "to men is
allotted what they earn and to women what they earn."37 Prostitution,
practicing magic, and other acts prohibited by the Islamic faith are
illegitimate means of acquiring property through personal efforts.
For land in territories conquered by Muslims, the following recorded
opinion of the Second Caliph, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, provides some insight:
If the Imam distributes the lands amongst those who captured them,
they become 'ushr lands, and their previous owners become slaves.
If he does not distribute the lands but leaves them in whole, as a
trust to the Muslims, then the poll-tax lies on the necks of their
owners, who are free, while their lands are charged with kharaj tax.3"
At first blush, it seems as though the Ottomans behaved in accordance
with the mandates of Islamic law, while the Palestinians violated its
provisions. The Empire conquered Palestine and retained ultimate
ownership of all Palestinian land in trust for the entire Muslim community
(umma muhammadiyeh). Since the Sultan forwent the opportunity to dole out
the spoils of war, he was entitled to taxes levied upon the land kept whole
for the free fellaheen's. His chosen method of taxation, however, essentially
divided the property by forcing the creation of individual landholders.
Taking a percentage of the village's total output is a plausible alternative that
would have kept the land intact.39 Collective taxation seems to be a better fit,
because plots of land in musha' tenure were rotated amongst families in the
community,' making it difficult to affix tax liability to any individual for
particular parcels of land within the village. When the Sultan's efforts to
enforce individual registration of land rights inevitably failed, he enacted the
least favorable laws to Islamic jurisprudence-European-style legal codes.
B. Ottoman Legal Codes
In less than a century, the Ottoman Sultan reversed the course of land,
tax, and administrative laws (Tanzimat), and the Civil Code (Majalla), in all
37 Ahmad, supra note 29 (quoting Quran 4:32).
38 Grossman, supra note 4, at 58.
39 In densely populated villages, the Sultan could have taxed the output of individual families
within the community. At that time, however, some villages consisted of merely clusters of the homes
of several lineages or extended kin groups." Bisharat, supra note 16.
40 Id.
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of Palestine. The Tanzimat legal reform movement, initiated by the Sultan
in 1839, resulted in the development of the French Model Commercial
Procedure Code, and the wholesale adoption of the French Model Penal
Code, the French Model Commercial Code, the French Model Land
Code,4 and the French Model Maritime Code by the time the Majalla was
adopted in Napoleonic form in 1877.42 Above all other laws enacted in the
19th century, the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 was the most influential
piece of legislation governing property law in Palestine.
The Land Code enacted by the Sultan abolished the musha' tenure
system by specifically prohibiting formally unrecognized collective land
rights.43 The Sultan enforced the Code by partitioning musha' holdings
between individual fellaheen in each community, and compelling the
registration of the properties accordingly. All property in the Ottoman
Empire was classified in terms of the following five categories defined by the
Code:
(1) Mulk, privately owned property: This form of land tenure was rare
(usually limited to the center of major villages), and restricted to dwelling
and limited appurtenant areas only."
(2) Miri, state owned property usufruct to landholders: Formal and
ultimate ownership (raqaba) of this property was held by the state, but
individual landholders could obtain rights of possession and usufruct
(tassaruj) if they cultivated the land and paid taxes. Miri property included
fields and agricultural lands, pastures, woodlands, and other land
surrounding villages, and was the most common form of land tenure.4"
(3) Mawat, state owned uncultivated and/or uninhabited property:
Forests, mountainous areas, and other unclaimed lands were considered
41 The French Model Land Code was subsequently amended to reflect the German land
inheritance system. U.N. Rule of Law Development, supra note 13.
42 The French Model Criminal Procedure Code was the last European legal code adopted by
the Sultan before British Occupation. Islamic law was not, however, fully eclipsed. Shari'a courts
maintained jurisdiction over personal status and land dedicated to religious purposes (waaJ), and the
Majalla was primarily a codification of Shari'a law. Id. See also Kourides, supra note 20, at 398-412
(describing the Majalla in detail).
43 See generally Bisharat, supra note 16, at 493 (describing the rise and fall of the musha' tenure
system).
" See, e.g., SoUAD R. DAJANi, RULING PALESTINE:AHISTORYOF THE LEGALLYSANCTIONED
JEWISH-ISRAELI SEIZURE OF LAND AND HOUSING IN PALESTINE 13 (Rob Stuart ed., The Centre on
Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 2005), available at
httpV/www.miftah.org/PrinterF.cftn?Docld=7413 (follow "To View the Full report As PDF File (1.76
MB)" hyperlink); Kedar, supra note 6, at 932-936; Bisharat, supra note 16, at 492-495.
45 Anyone who held and cultivated the Empire's land for a period of 10 years had the right to
register the property in his/her name as miri land according to Article 78 of the Ottoman Legal Code. Id.
at 541.
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mawat, "dead." Farmers could establish claims to dead land with State
permission, or by cultivating it.46
(4) Matruka, state owned land preserved for public use: The state
allocated this property for communal and public purposes. Roadbeds and
village threshing floors, for instance, were considered communal lands.47
(5) Waqf, property holdings of the Islamic charitable endowment: The
Supreme Muslim Council controlled these lands which were dedicated to
pious purposes.48
C. Land Registration Prior to British Occupation
Since the Ottoman Land Code was enacted to curb tax evasion and the
shirking of military conscription, Palestinians frequently avoided the Land
Registry offices (Tabu).49 Thefillaheen evaded the Empire's land registrars
and otherwise thwarted their efforts by understating the size of their
property, or by disavowing claims to the land entirely. In addition, villagers
vested title to village lands in the name of a few village leaders, or in the
name of fictitious or deceased individuals. Further complicating matters
were absentee Arab landowners. Absentee landlords, who were usually
members of wealthy Syrian and Lebanese merchant families, leased
Palestinian property to thefellaheen. °
Although the villagers successfully circumvented tax liability and the
draft, they ultimately paid a heftier price. Zionist colonization in Palestine
began in earnest around 1882,5' spurring the sale of substantial tracts of
Palestinian land by absentee landlords for handsome purchase prices.
46 Id. at 492-495. Mawat is sometimes spelled mewat.
47 Id.
48 Id. Waqfis considered immutable and inalienable because it is divine. Hamas, and other
Islamist movements, have interpreted the recorded opinion of the Second Caliph as conferring waqf
status to all land conquered in holy war (ihad). Grossman, supra note 4, at 57-58. Since Palestine was
conquered by a Muslim Empire, British and Israeli occupation of Palestine runs afoul to Hamas'
assertion that waqfis inalienable outside the Muslim community. Id.
49 See, e.g., Kedar, supra note 6, at 932-934 (describing the "[dis-]order" of land registration
during the late Ottoman period); Bisharat, supra note 16, at 494-95 (identifying the methods employed
byfillaheen to avoid registering their property rights).
so E.g., Danny Rubinstein, Turkey Transfers Ottoman Land Records to Palestinian Authority,
HAARETZ, Nov. 10, 2005, available at http'/www.jerusalemites.org /articles /english/oct2005/13.htm;
Fattah, supra note 15. See also Bisharat, supra note 16, at 484 ("The Zionists sometimes referred to the
Arab local society as an example of"Arab feudalism" epitomized by a class of absentee Arab landowners
known as the efndis).
5 Dajani, supra note 44. George Bisharat, a professor of law at the Hastings College of Law,
cites the foundation of the Rishon-le-Zion colony in 1881 near present-day Tel Aviv as the beginning
of Zionist colonization in Palestine. Bisharat, supra note 16, at 496.
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Oustedfelaheen had no registered property rights and therefore no recourse.
Within the villages that remained, the customary system of communal land
tenure was replaced with a landlord-tenant arrangement by village leaders
usurping the fellaheen's formerly enforceable property rights.5 2 The few
fellaheen who actually registered individual land rights also lost their property
rights because the registered description of the property was usually
inaccurate. By the end of the Ottoman period, only about five percent of the
land in Palestine had been registered, 3 and the Prophet Muhammad's
admonition not to use one's property in a manner harmful to others was all
but forgotten.'
II. 1917-1948: BRITISH OCCUPATION
As World War I drew to a close, British forces defeated the Ottomans
and occupied Palestine. The broad legislative and administrative powers
conferred by the Palestine Mandate were tempered by the Mandate
administration's policy of maintaining the pre-war "status quo.
"
m5
Consequently, the British enacted most land ordinances as amendments to
pre-existing Ottoman law, and avoided legislating a new land code.
5 6
52 Bisharat, supra note 16, 494-95.
53 Kedar, supra note 6.
54 The Prophet Muhammad said: "One should not harm himself or others." Badawi, supra note
22. The Qur'an echoes this belief by prohibiting the use of property in a fashion that would deprive
others of their justly acquired property (2:188), and prohibiting the diversion of property held in trust
for another for the trustee's personal benefit (2:2; 4:10). Ahmad, supra note 29. Outlawing the
monopolization of necessities, Badawi, supra note 33, is yet another example. In terms of the fellaheen's
situation, village leaders violated Shari'a by appropriating the property rights they held in trust for their
fellow villagers. Although the absentee Arab landlords were not in a similar situation of trust, disregard
for the fate of their tenants is equally reprehensible. Ultimately, the musha' tenure system was likely the
most in keeping with the Islamic faith at that time since a common vested interest amongst villagers
engendered common courtesy with respect to the use of Palestinian property.
55 Decreed by the League of Nations in 1922, the first Article of the Palestine Mandate provides:
"The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited
by the terms of this Mandate." The Mandate for Palestine, League of Nations, Art. 1, July 24, 1922,
MODERN HIST. SOURCEBOOK, available at http;//www.fordham.edu/halsalVmod/1922mandate.html; see
Geremy Forman & Alexandre Kedar, Colonialism, Colonization, and Land Law in Mandate Palestine: The Zor
AI-Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya Land Disputes in Historical Perspective, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 491, 519-
520 (2003) (explaining the Mandate administration's policies and dictates).
56 Dajani, supra note 44, at 23.
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A. British Interpretation of the Ottoman Land Code
British authorities established Land Courts to regulate the Palestinians'
registered and customary land rights which had been thrown into disarray
at the end of the Ottoman Empire.17  In the absence of superseding
Mandatory property laws, the Courts attempted to enforce the Ottoman
Land Code. The drive for individual registration of property rights was
championed by Palestine's chief land reform expert Sir Ernest Dowson5
Nevertheless, innovative interpretation of the Code by British officials,
coupled with the Mandatory's amendments to the Code, provided ample
justification for the expropriation of Palestinian land.
The Mewat Land Ordinance (1921) was one of the most damaging
Mandatory laws to Palestinian property interests. During Ottoman rule, the
fellaheen were free to acquire property rights in barren lands provided they
render them arable. The Ordinance, however, replaced the last paragraph
of Article 103 of the Ottoman Land Code with the following provision:
"Any person who without obtaining the consent of the Administration
breaks up or cultivates any waste land shall obtain no right to a title-deed for
such land and further, will be liable to be prosecuted for trespass.
" 59
Heretofore, no official permission was required. The rural and often
illiterate farmers, already wary of the Mandatory's authority and the land
registry system, now risked becoming trespassers on grounds they had been
legally farming for years.
The British seizure of property as unregistered mewat land in Zor al-
Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya illustrates the force of the Land Courts' authority
to interpret the Ottoman Land Code in the Mandatory's favor.' The
57 Bisharat, supra note 16, at 495.
58 See Forman & Kedar, supra note 55, at 508-509 ("[Sir Dowson's] program .. . aimed to
transform Palestine's land regime from one based primarily on usage rights, often communal in nature,
to one based on secure individual ownership").
59 The Palestinians were afforded some reprieve. If they had violated the Ordinance before it
was enacted, they could apply for a title deed within two months of its publication. In practice, the
Mandatory administration generally allowed for the registration of land rights even ifthe prescribed time
for registration had lapsed. See Kedar, supra note 6, at 936 (quoting the Mewat Land Ordinance, and
describing its application).
60 Geremy Forman, a Ph.D. candidate in the University of Haifa's Department of Land of Israel
Studies, and Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, a Lecturer in the University of Haifa's Faculty of Law, discuss
the use of"colonial law" to resolve the disputes at Zor al-Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya. The "colonial law"
of the Mandate legal system is defined as "the interpretation of Ottoman law by colonial officials, the use
of foreign legal concepts, and the transformation of Ottoman law through supplementary legislation."
See generally Forman & Kedar, supra note 55, at 491. They cite the historian Martin Bunton's case studies
as support for their contention that "the concept of colonial law.., cannot be limited to imported
Western concepts alone." See id. at 502.
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dispute began when Mandate authorities agreed to lease Zor al-Zarqa and
Barrat Qisarya to the PalestineJewish Colonization Association ("PJCA").6'
The arguments advanced by Palestinian farmers facing eviction were: (1) the
farmers had legally protected rights in the mewat property by virtue of their
longstanding use of the land; alternatively, (2) the property could not be held
in exclusive possession with a title deed because it was matruka. The PJCA
and Mandate officials refused to acknowledge any of the legal rights asserted
by the Palestinians on the grounds that their rights were not registered, and
any rights they may have had were strictly "moral."
62
Norman Bentwich, the Mandate government's Attorney General, was
in charge of the legal officials assessing the nature of Palestinian rights in the
dispute. 63 Because the communities of Zor al-Zarqa and Barrat Qisarya
were established as tent encampments, Bentwich did not accord them the
status of a full-fledged village. Absent a village, he reasoned, there is no
community with a vested interest in the public uses of the land. In addition,
his report classified the Palestinians' traditional rights to the shared use of
the land, such as for grazing or camping, as unenforceable "moral" rights.
He identified any residual interests the villagers may have as "rights of
common," an English common law concept similar to matruka but less
restrictive (i.e. it does not prohibit expropriation). The Bentwich report
concluded the property was mewat that could be legitimately leased to the
PJCA with the exception of some cultivated lands.
Faced with the threat of expropriation, the residents of Zor al-Zarqa
eventually agreed to settle their land claims. The Barrat Qisarya dispute,
however, made its way to court where two out of three judges issued rulings
61 The Baron Edmond de Rothschild established several Jewish colonies in Palestine, and
entrusted their administration to the Jewish Colonization Association. The Jewish Colonization
Association's operations in Palestine were reorganized in the mid-1920's into the Palestine Jewish
Colonization Association. Id. at 511. Mandate authorities often worked in concert with Jewish
colonization officials in the spirit of the Balfour Declaration, a letter written by Lord Balfour to Lord
Rothschild. The letter relays a "declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been
submitted to, and approved by, the [British] Cabinet" as follows: "His [Great Britain's] Majesty's
Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people,
and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this objective, it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed byJews in any other country."
Letter from Lord Arthur James Balfour, British Foreign Secretary, to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild
(Nov. 2, 1917), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/balfour.htm (last visitedJan. 19,
2007).
6 The notion of "moral" rights is "an imported non-Ottoman term indicating a lack of legal
basis." Forman & Kedar, supra note 55, at 517.
63 See id. at 520-523 (elaborating on the conclusions of the Bentwich report).
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favorable to the local residents. 64 Despite the farmers' failure to seek state
approval for the cultivation ofmewat land, which was a literal violation of the
Mewat Land Ordinance, all three judges concurred in the decision to register
cultivated lands in the names of their cultivators. Robert Drayton, then the
British government's Solicitor General, concealed the rulings ofJudges Ali
Hasna and Said Tuqan regarding the remainder of the property. Those
rulings qualified the property, mostly pastureland, as matruka. In accordance
with the ruling of the third judge, British District Court President Plunkett,
the British government decided the property was mewat. It granted the
PJCA a concession to approximately one third of Barrat Qisarya.65 Like the
residents of Zor al-Zarqa, the people of Barrat Qisarya ultimately settled
with the PJCA, albeit 15 years after the decision.
B. British Land Ordinances
In addition to creating the Land Courts, the British government
advanced a number of land ordinances in an attempt to bring some order to
the land tenure system in Palestine. The redress of aberrant registration
began almost immediately after occupation. British authorities closed the
Tabu in 1918, suspending registration of property rights for the two years it
took the British administration to draft and pass the Land Transfer Ordinance
(1920). 6 The Palestine Order in Council of 1922, which provided for the
introduction of British common law andjudicial structures in nearly all legal
fields,67 facilitated the implementation of future ordinances enacted by the
Mandatory. As a result, the Land (Settlement of Title) Ordinance (1928)
became so entrenched in the Palestinian legal system it survived the end of
the Mandate, and remains in effect in Israel to the present day.68
The Land Ordinance (1928) triggered an unprecedented survey of
Palestinian lands, registering finite property rights and extinguishing ancient
64 See id. at 528-532 (describing the legal proceeding and final settlement).
65 The PJCA leased 10,000 of the 32,000 dunams (1 dunam = 1,000 square meters) that
comprised Barrat Qisarya. Id. at 531-532.
66 The Land Transfer Ordinance of 1920 primarily reformed land transactions between Arab
landlords and Jewish purchasers. While it can be argued that the Ordinance's provisions are favorable
to Jewish interests, they nevertheless effected improvements in the accuracy of the land registry. One
clause, for instance, compels the grantor of a piece of property to provide alternative "viable lots" for
"tenants in occupation." Although this usually imposed a duty on Arab landlords to vacate Palestinian
tenants, at least the person(s) in possession of the property would coincide with the property's owner on
file with the Tabu. But cf Dajani, supra note 44, at 23 (suggesting a complete lack of genuine
administrative rationale for the laws enacted by the British Mandate).
67 Contracts remained subject to Majalla. U.N. Rule of Law Development, supra note 13.
68 Kedar, supra note 6, at 938-939.
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claims throughout the state. The British adopted a version of the Torrens
system, a numbered bloc and parcel survey system based on precise
mapping, tailored to accommodate the particular needs of Mandate
Palestine. 69 Due to the inaccuracy of the property rights previously
registered with the Tabu, a judicial investigation of each parcel of land
occurred before title to it was settled.
Investigations obstructed claims to unregistered rights in the land by
terminating the passage of time in cases of adverse possession at the outset
of the inquiry, and by terminating all claims made prior to the inquiry at its
close. Settlement of title was final. By the end of the British Mandate of
Palestine, title to approximately twenty percent of Palestinian land had been
settled. 70
C. Loss of the Palestinian State
Competing interests in Palestinian property rights gave rise to the Great
Arab Revolt (1936-1939) between native Arab populations and Jewish
settlers.7 Consequently, the Mandate administration enacted the Land
Transfer Regulations (1940), considerably restrictingJewish immigration and
land transfers.7 2 Mandate Palestine was split into three zones. Each zone
had its own conditions precedent to obtaining government permission for
the sale or lease of property.
Zones "A" and "B" were heavily restricted, and accounted for ninety-five
percent of Palestinian territory. Only in the "free zone," zone "C," were
69 See id. (describing British adaptation of the Torrens system in Palestine and the development
of the Land (Settlement of Title) Ordinance of 1928).
70 Id.; Dajani, supra note 44, at 23.
71 The Great Arab Revolt marked the beginning of organized military combat between Arabs
and Jews that plagues the Middle East to this day. The Jewish paramilitary group Haganah became the
foundation ofthe Israel Defense Forces (Israel's present-day armed forces), and terrorist Zionist military
groups, such as the Irgun, were dissolved following the creation of the State of Israel. Constant warfare
between Palestinian forces, such as the terrorist group Hamas, and Israeli forces later became the
grounds for Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip. E.g. Great Uprising, WIKIPEDIA, available at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GreatUprising (last visited Sept. 23, 2006); Stacy Howlett, Palestinian Private
Property Rights in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 34 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 117, 125-126 (2001).
72 The Land Transfer Regulations were promulgated during World War II, following the issuance
of a British White Paper in 1939. The McDonald White Paper, named after British Colonial Secretary
Malcolm McDonald, was an official statement of policy wherein the British government made
concessions to the Palestinians on a wide range of issues. Fearing Arab alliance with the Axis powers,
the Government reversed course on their previous pledge in the Balfour Declaration (i.e. to support
Zionist colonization) in order to curry favor with the Palestinians. See British White Paper ofJune 1922
(June 10, 1922), available at httpV'/www.yale.edu/lawweh/avalon/mideast/brwh1922.htm; see also Dajani,
supra note 44, at 25 (expanding upon the particular provisions of the Land Transfer Regulations).
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property transactions virtually unencumbered. Since the Gaza Strip
straddled zones "A" and "B," the Palestinians kept title to seventy-five
percent of Gaza.73 Of the remaining land, twenty-one percent was publicly-
owned (i.e. property of Mandate Palestine), and four percent was the
property ofJewish-Zionist collectives.
In November 1947, as the Mandate was expiring, the United Nations
adopted a "Partition Plan for Palestine." The Plan increased the property
holdings of Jewish settlers in Palestine from the five percent they owned
during the Mandate to fifty-five percent.74 Although Palestinians were
entitled to forty-five percent of the property in their State, many left their
land.
Of the 757,182 Palestinians accounted for in the 1922 census, seventy
thousand had departed byJanuary 1948, and pressure fromJewish military
operations was rising.75 The armies of six neighboring Arab nations
mobilized to meet the threat ofJewish conquest in Palestine. Another four
hundred thousand Palestinians, close to half the final number of Palestinian
refugees, evacuated by the time Israel declared itself an independent State on
May 14, 1948.76 The Arab armies subsequently failed to remove Jewish
settlers from most of Palestine. The Palestinians, having already abandoned
their property for what they thought would be a rapid defeat of Jewish
forces, were left with little else than their keys.
I1. 1948-1967: EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION
King Farouk of Egypt signed an Armistice Agreement with Israel in
1949, confirming Egyptian control of the Gaza Strip for nearly twenty years
to follow. Although several administrative, procedural, and regulatory
reforms were introduced, few changes were made to property laws affecting
Palestinian interests. This absence of change is not surprising because both
the Egyptian administration and the former Ottoman Empire interpreted
Shari'a law from the perspective of the Hanaf! School of Islamic juris-
73 Figures are based on a land ownership and population distribution study performed by the
United Nations from 1945 to 1946. Id. at 26.
74 In the aggregate, fifty-six percent of Palestine was to become part of the "Jewish State"
according to the provisions of the Partition Plan. In practice, however, Jews only controlled between
eleven and fourteen percent of Palestinian territory. See, e.g., Bisharat supra note 16, at 501-502
(describing the Partition Plan and land distribution prior to and after its adoption by the United
Nations); Dajani, supra note 44, at 27-28.
75 Dajani, supra note 44, at 16, 28.
76 ,.j
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prudence .7 As a result, they generally reasoned similarly.78 The Basic Law
issued by the Egyptian administration in 1955 validated pre-existing law as
applicable. It was, for the most part, the primary piece of legislation
governing the Gaza Strip until Israeli occupation in 1967. 79
IV. 1967-2005: ISRAELI RULE
The Israel Defense Forces invaded Egypt on June 5, 1967, gaining
control of the Gaza Strip after six days of combat. The military action was
justified as a pre-emptive strike against an Egyptian attack the Israelis
believed to be imminent80 Although Israel claimed it would retain pre-
occupation law, subject to the occupant's power under the 1907 Hague
Regulations,81 it enacted over 1100 military orders, effectively amending,
changing, or repealing the laws in place during the Egyptian administration
of Gaza. 2
7 U.N. Rule ofLaw Development, supra note 13;Palestine/Palestinian Territories ofWest Bank and
Gaza Strip, available at httpz'/www.law.emory.edu /IFLAegaVpalestine.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 2006).
For a discussion of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, see Abdal-Haqq, supra note 21, at 46-47;
Kourides, supra note 20, at 392-93.
78 Scholars of Islamic jurisprudence usefiqh (inferences drawn by scholars) to derive Shari'a
from the Qur'an, and other sources of Islamic law. Each school of Islamic jurisprudence employs
different methodologies in their interpretation of Sharia. Since legal scholars (and lawyers and judges
interpreting the law) are humans, their determinations regarding the law are not recognized by Islamists
who believe only in the divine word of the Qur'an. E.g. Fiqh, WIKIPEDIA,
http//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fiqh (last visited Sept. 23, 2006); Sharia, supra note 19.
79 Whereas the Basic Law was issued as a new Constitution for the Gaza Strip, the Constitutional
Order, issued in 1962 by the Egyptian administration, was enacted to maintain a distinct Palestinian
identity, and is additional proof of Egyptian reluctance to take a more active role in the administration
of Gaza. It provided that all laws and court decisions were to be issued in the name of the Palestinian
people. U.N. Rule of Law Development, supra note 13.
80 Egypt closed the Straits ofTiran to Israeli shipping, and deployed troops in the Sinai near the
Israeli border. E.g. Six-Day War, WIKIPEDIA, available at http;//en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-DayWar (last
visited Sept. 23, 2006). Israel then attacked Egypt. A month later, the Israeli Prime Minister claimed
Israel acted in "legitimate defense." E.g. John Quigley, Living in Legal Limbo: Israel's Settlers in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, 10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 1, 5 (1998).
s By proclamation in June 1967, the Regional Commander of the Israel Defense Forces
declared the continued validity of prior existing law in the area, insofar as it did not conflict with any
other Israeli regulations. E.g. Bisharat, supra note 16, at 528; see also Dajani, supra note 44, at 79
(elaborating on the application of the Proclamation on Law and Administration).
8 U.N. Rule of Law Development, supra note 13.
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A. Compliance with International Law s3
International Law pertaining to belligerent occupation, codified in the
1907 Hague Convention IV ("Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land"), prohibits the confiscation of private property.' It also
requires that the occupying state administer the occupied territory "in
accordance with the rules of usufruct."85 Article 43 of the Convention,
amongst others, allows some latitude to confiscate occupied property as
follows: "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all measures in his power to
restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while
respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country. " 6
Accordingly, Israeli courts adjudicating land disputes justified the
expropriation of property in the Gaza Strip as "necessary for peace-keeping"
(i.e. for military use in order to keep the peace).
Both the military tribunals introduced throughout Gaza and the Israeli
Supreme Court supervised Israel's compliance with international law."
Adjudication by the expert sensibilities of the High Court, however, was
often of no avail to the Palestinians since the Court lacked the power of
judicial review.s Irrespective of the underlying legality of property laws, the
judges were constrained to rule in the state's favor unless a petitioner
83 Since the focus of this article relates to property laws rather than issues of human rights, the
Fourth Geneva Convention "Relative to the Protection ofCivilian Persons in Time ofWar" (1949), and
other international laws related to the treatment of persons, will not be addressed. It is worth noting,
however, that when the Israeli Supreme Court has considered these issues, it ruled as follows: "From
a legal viewpoint the source for the authority and the power of the military commander in a territory
subject to belligerent occupation is in the rules of public international law relating to belligerent
occupation (occpatio beilka), and which constitute a part of the laws ofwar." HCJ 393/82Amashulia v. IDF
Commander inJudea and Samaria [4], at p. 793 (quoted in HCJ 7015/02 Ajuri v. IDF Commander, a case
related to an order ofassigned residence). Settlements, when discussed, are analyzed in terms ofthe legal
implications of confiscating property in a permanent fashion in order to settle civilians.
84 Hague Convention IV. Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 46, Oct. 18,
1907, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lawofwar/hague04.htm [hereinafter Hague
Convention IV].
85 Hague Convention IV. art. 55, supra note 84.
86 Hague Convention IV. art. 43, supra note 84.
97 The Israeli Supreme Court extended its "personal jurisdiction over all military government
personnel operating in their official capacities" to land disputes in the Occupied Territories. Bisharat,
supra note 16, at 529.
88 Israel adopted the British model of Parliamentary supremacy. Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, On
the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic Settler States: Notes Towards a Research Agenda, in 5 CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES, LAW AND GEO. 401,427 (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., Oxford University Press 2003).
20 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol.15:1
persuaded them that the legislation authorizing dispossession was not
applicable to the petitioner's property.
The Beit EI-Toubas and Elon Moreh cases illustrate the state's ability to
influence the judiciary. Although both cases involve the requisitioning of
Palestinian land for "military purposes," they were decided differently. The
opinion of Israeli Supreme Court Justice Berinzon sheds some light on the
inconsistency:
We understand and appreciate the human goal and wish of the
District Court Judges ... to recognize the rights of [Palestinian]
respondents to their property as equal citizens ... [However] as
judges we are not free to refrain from rendering the correct
interpretation of the law just because the result might seem to us
unsatisfactory.89
Essentially, the landholders in the Elon Moreh dispute succeeded where
those of the Beit El-Toubas case failed-they convinced the judges that
seizure of their property was beyond the scope of applicable military
ordinances. Had the ordinances applied, both cases would have been
decided against the property interests of Palestinians.
Numerous military orders were issued during Israeli occupation,
declaring areas of occupied Palestinian territory "closed" for "military
purposes." 9° One such order resulted in the expropriation of land in the
villages of Beit El and Toubas.9' A dispute arose when the Israeli
government authorized its citizens to build homes on the expropriated land,
land originally allocated for the expansion of Israeli army posts. The
Palestinian petitioners argued their property, which had been seized on the
basis of "essential and urgent military needs," served no security purpose as
an Israeli civilian settlement. The Israeli Supreme Court disagreed.
9 justice Berinzon, ofthe Israeli Supreme Court, in The Custodian ofAbsentee Property v. Samara
(1956), id., at 401.
90 See e.g., Bisharat, supra note 16, at 534 (describing Article 125 of the Dfense (Emergency)
Regulations as a tool for land acquisition in the Occupied Territories); see also Dajani, supra note 44, at 81-
85 (cataloguing the many military orders requisitioning occupied property for "security" purposes, such
as those declaring lands "closed areas" like Military Order No. 151 and Military Order No. 34, both named
Order Concerning Closed Areas).
91 Although the villages of both Beit El and Toubas are located in the West Bank, the Court's
decision was applicable to and binding on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and is therefore relevant to this
article. See, e.g., Bisharat, supra note 16, at 535-537 (describing the Beit El-Toubas dispute and resolution);
see also Dajani, supra note 44, at 68-69 (expanding upon the final rulings of the Supreme Court in the Beit
EI-Toubas case).
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In holding that the 1907 Hague Convention had not been violated, the
Court adopted the Israeli position that the settlers served a military purpose
by deterring and supervising terrorist Palestinian operations.' Although the
Court usually deferred to the military authority, 9 as was the case in Beit El
and Toubas, it refused to validate a similar seizure of land for military
purposes in the case of the Elon Moreh settlement.
Like the Beit EI-Toubas incident, the dispute in the Elon Moreh case
stemmed from Israeli requisitioning of occupied Palestinian land for
supposed military use. 94 Once again the land seized was converted into an
Israeli civilian settlement. Unlike the settlers of Beit El and Toubas,
however, the Gush Emunim settlers of Elon Moreh staked their claim to
Palestinian property squarely in terms of their religious and political right to
settle the land of the Jewish people. A complete lack of militaryjustification
for the settlement of civilians on the privately owned property of an
occupied territory is a direct breach of the 1907 Hague Convention.
Therefore, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected the defense.
Drawing on the findings of legal anthropologist John Comaroff, legal
geographers Geremy Forman and Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar suggest "the use
of the colonizer's legal system in order to challenge existing power
structures" is a frequent occurrence amongst subjugated peoples.9 The
Palestinians' attempts to reclaim their land through appeals to the Israeli
High Court in the Beit EI-Toubas and Elon Moreh cases are no exception.
Unfortunately, counter-hegemonic challenges to "the use of law as
92 Article 52 of the 1907 Hague Conventions provides that "requisitions in kind and services
shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of
occupation." Hague Convention IV. art. 52, supra note 84. The Court was of the opinion that such a need
was satisfied since "terrorist elements ... [do not operate as easily] in an area where there are also
persons likely to look out for them and to report any suspicious movement to the authorities." Dajani,
supra note 44, at 68.
93 In Israel at that time, the Minister of Defense would back affidavits issued by military
commanders stating requisitioned land was needed "for security." The Supreme Court would then
accept the statements in the affidavits at face value, in accordance with Court precedent of the 1950s
forward. Questioning the veracity of the "security reasons" in light of the factual evidence was effectively
foreclosed. Israel Shahak, Israeli Land Seizure in the Occupied Territories, J. OF THE MIDDLE EAST POL'Y
COUNCIL, available at http://www.mepc.org/publicasp/journalshahak/shahak4O.asp.
94 Since the Court's decision in the Elon Moreh case was applicable to and binding on Palestinians
in the Gaza Strip, the case is relevant to this article even though the dispute occurred in the West Bank.
See, e.g., Howlett, supra note 68, at 141-142 (expanding upon the drawbacks of the Elon Moreh decision
from the perspective of Palestinian landholders); see also Bisharat, supra note 16, at 537-538 (summarizing
the Elon Moreh case); see also Dajani, supra note 44, at 75-76 (describing the Elon Moreh case's legacy in
terms of the Israeli Government's subsequent tactic of declaring land as "state land").
95 Forman & Kedar, supra note 55, at 495-496.
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domination and warfare (or "lawfare," as Comaroff terms it)"96 have been
historically unsuccessful.
In the United States, for instance, the Native Americans' appeals to
American courts have, like the appeals of the Beit EI-Toubas petitioners,
traditionally fallen on deaf ears. As explained by ChiefJustice Marshall of
the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case ofJohnson v. McIntosh:
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the Conqueror cannot
deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals
may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been
successfully asserted .... It is not for the Courts of this country to
question the validity of this title, or to sustain one which is
incompatible with it.97
Even though the Israelis were theoretically mere "occupiers" of the Gaza
Strip, they usurped Palestinians' property rights, exercising the force of a
conqueror. The Israeli Supreme Court usually deferred to the government's
decisions rather than questioning the validity of title vested by the military.
Had the Gush Emunim settlers proffered even the most tenuous security
purpose for the establishment of their settlement, such as the potential
deterrence of alleged terrorist activities, they might not have fallen prey to
the limits of their own hegemony.
The Palestinians' victory in the Elon Moreh case was short-lived. The
military administration subsequently provided an alternate means of
legitimately expropriating occupied territory for the Gush Emunim settlers:
designating Palestinian property as "state land."9
9 Id. at 496.
9 Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588-589 (Mar. 10, 1823).
9 The Israeli Supreme Court's decision in the Elon Moreh case was limited to the seizure of
privately owned lands. Accordingly, the Elon Moreh Settlement was established on nearby "state land."
E.g. Bisharat, supra note 16, at 541; Dajani, supra note 44, at 76. Many articles address the seizure of
Palestinian land in the Occupied Territories in the context of laws enacted during different Israeli
Administrations to further the government's policies at the time. In that context, Israeli military law
(discussed in section (IV)(B) of this article) first proliferated with the rise of the Likud government to
power in 1977. During prior administrations, the taking ofland in occupied Palestine was usually limited
to military requisitions for security purposes. The establishment of the Elon Moreh settlement on "state
land" after an adverse Supreme Court ruling is attributed to the actions in concert of Shimon Peres
(while still a Minister of Defense), Ezer Weizmann (Minister of Defense after Peres), Aharon Barak
(then Attorney General, current President of the Supreme Court), and Ms. Pli'a Albek (of the Israeli
Ministry ofJustice). See, e.g., Howlett, supra note 71, at 140-41 (describing the policies and legislation
of the Likud party); Dajani, supra note 44, at 73-77 (describing the Allon Plan, the Dayan Plan, the
Sharon Plan, the Drobless (Drobles) Plan, and the Seven Stars Plan); Shahak, supra note 93 (discussing
the particulars of the Elon Moreh settlement).
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B. Israeli Military Law"
After occupying the Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli Military assumed
legislative functions. ° In addition to seizing land for military purposes, the
Military took Palestinian property by legalizing the expropriation of "state
land," land requisitioned for public purposes, and abandoned property. The
courts (military tribunals and the Israeli Supreme Court), already lacking the
authority to review the legality of the orders, were further restricted by them
when attempting to settle the disputes they generated.
Military Order No. 841, for instance, empowered the Area Commander
to close the investigation of a land dispute, or to refrain from proceeding
with the case entirely." 1 Issued onJune 27,1967, the Law andAdministration
Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) affirmed Israeli sovereignty in the Gaza Strip,
thereby authorizing Israeli rule and laying the groundwork for the military
orders that followed.1 2
1. PRE-OCCUPATION LAW: "PUBLIC LAND"
One of the first proclamations issued by the Military authorized the
Israeli Government to seize "state property."'0 3 Of the five categories of land
99 Negotiations between Palestinians and the Israeli government effected changes in Israeli
military legislation and administration. For example, Military Order No. 947, Order Concerning the
Establishment of a Civilian Administration (issued two years after the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty),
divested the Area Commander of much of his powers, transferring administration of many Military
Orders to a Palestinian Civilian Administration. The Civilian Administration later served as a model for
the establishment of the Palestinian Authority during the negotiation of the Oslo Accords. A complete
discussion of the different legislative stages of the Israeli military, and the entire body of military orders,
is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., Dajani, supra note 44, at 65-121 (detailing the process of land
acquisition and settlement building in the Gaza Strip from 1967 to 1993).
100 U.N. Rule of Law Development, supra note 13.
lo Military Order No. 841, Order Concerning Closure of Investigation Files, issued on May 15, 1980,
provides as follows: "It is permissible for the Area Commander or the legal advisor to close an
investigation or to refrain from proceeding with a certain case if they think that there is no public interest
served by the investigation or the trial." Dajani, supra note 44, at 102 (quoting Military Order No. 841).
102 The Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, 5727-1967, provides as
follows: "The law,jurisdiction and administration of the State shall extend to any area of the Eretz Israel
designated by the Government by order." Other government orders specified which lands were
included in Eretz Israel, such as the Gaza Strip. Like the many laws that followed, the Ordinance was
an amendment to a prior law enacted after the declaration of an Israeli State (the Law andAdministration
Ordinance of 1948). Dajani, supra note 44, at 70.
103 See Dajani, supra note 44, at 79-80 (discussing the Proclamation on Law and Administration No.
l and No. 2).
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enumerated in the Ottoman Land Code, none specifically equates to "state
land." That category was introduced by Great Britain's 1922 Palestine Order
in Council, which referred to "state land" as "public land," and defined public
property as: "all lands in Palestine which are subject to the control of the
government.., and all lands which are or shall be acquired for the public
service or otherwise.""° The latter part of the definition became the basis
for military orders sanctioning the expropriation of land for public
purposes. 05
In keeping with the 1907 Hague Conventions, the Israeli government
ostensibly enforced pre-occupation law, which was primarily the law of the
British Mandate. Israeli and British enforcement of the law had some major
differences. Neither the British nor the Ottomans intended to extinguish
tassaruf rights in miri, and "state land" did not necessarily encompass all
matruka and mewat lands. 1°' The Israeli government's land survey team
sidestepped customary titles to property, and the military concomitantly
declared unregistered miri, mewat, and matruka properties alike "state land."
"Declarations of state land" were presumptively valid, 0 7 and were issued by
the "Custodian of Public (Government) Property," which amounts to a
second significant divergence from pre-occupation law.
Military Order No. 59, Military Order Concerning State Property, gives the
Custodian of Public Property control of all "state property."'08 The Order
further removes the Custodian's declarations from judicial review by
exempting "good faith" transactions from cancellation, "even if it is proven
that the property in question was not state property at the time when the
transaction was made."'" Ultimately, manipulation of pre-occupation law
divested landholders in Gaza of their property rights as effectively as the new
laws enacted for the same purpose.
104 The Palestine Order in Council, Part I., Aug. 10, 1922, United Nations Information System
on the Question of Palestine, available at http://domino.un.org /UNISPAL.NSF/0
/c7aae 196f41aa055052565f50054e656?OpenDocument.
Jos A number of military orders applicable to the Gaza Strip were issued in the spirit of Military
Order No. 108, Order Concerning Amendment to Law of Land Expropriation (For Public Purposes), amending
Jordanian laws of the West Bank that permitted the confiscation of property for public purposes. See
generally Dajani, supra note 44, at 80-105.
106 E.g., Bisharat, supra note 16, at 539; Howlett, supra note, 71 at 139-40.
10? Bisharat, supra note 16, at 540.
108 Dajani, supra note 44, at 89.
109 See id. (quoting Military Order No. 59).
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2. POST-OCCUPATION LAW: "ABSENTEE PROPERTY"
Enacted onJuly 23,1967, Military Order No. 58, Order ConcerningAbsentee
Property (Private Property), was the foremost piece of new legislation
authorizing the seizure of Palestinian property. Property owned or
controlled by a resident of a "hostile" country, and "property whose legal
owner, or whoever is granted the power to control it by law, left the area
prior to 7 June 1967 or subsequently," was declared "abandoned" or
"absentee" property." ° Included in the definition of "property" were
"immovable" and "movable" properties, such as "stone quarries" and
"business assets.""'
Much like the Military Order Concerning State Property, Military Order No.
58 transferred the rights previously vested in the property's owner to a
Custodian for safekeeping. Similar to the Custodian of Public Property, the
"Custodian of Absentee Property" benefited from a "good faith" proviso in
the Order, which validated transactions in land "even if it is subsequently
proved that the property was not at that time Absentee Property."'" 2 Their
functions, however, differed slightly since the Custodian of Absentee
Property was primarily supposed to preserve property for its return to
owners who credibly establish their property rights. Transferring the
absentee property to the Development Authority, which was authorized to
dispose of it, diminished the effects of the Custodian's limitations.
Eventually, a single "Custodian of Government and Abandoned Property in
Judea and Samaria" assumed the functions of both its predecessors (i.e. the
Custodian of Public (Government) Property and the Custodian ofAbsentee
Property), facilitating the declaration of "abandoned land" as "state land."" t3
While Military Order No. 58 was novel in the sense that the Palestinians
in Gaza had yet to lose land on the grounds that it was abandoned, it was not
the first time abandoned property was confiscated in Gaza. Order No. 25,
Providing Regulationsfor the Administration ofJews' Property in the Areas Subject to
the Control of the Egyptian Forces in Palestine, granted an Egyptian Director
General the right to manage Jewish property deserted in Gaza during the
t10 See Dajani, supra note 44 (quotingMilitary Order No. 58), at 85; see also Bisharat, supra note 16,
at 534-35 (describing the application of Military Order No. 58); see also Howlett, supra note 71 at 145-46
(describing the application of Military Order No. 58). For purposes of this section, discussion of the
Absentee Property Law relates to the original Order (Military Order No. 58, Order Concerning Absentee
Property (Private Property)July 23 1967) and its later amendments.
III See Dajani, supra note 44, at 85.
112 Id.
113 Dajani, supra note 44, at 85.
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1948 conflict.1 4  Despite the difference in rationales advanced for the
enactment of the Israeli and Egyptian orders,"' they comparably resulted in
the expropriation of property for public use or private leasing.
Jewish landholders demanding restitution of property seized pursuant
to Egyptian Order No. 25 presented the 1967 Israeli occupiers with a
dilemma. The government could either maintain the pre-occupation
practice of withholding expropriated Jewish property, or reverse course by
returning the holdings of its citizens to their pre-1948 owners.
In an ironic turn of events, the Israeli military enacted Military Order No.
78, Order Concerning Jews' Property (The Gaza Strip and North Sinai), which
essentially validated an absentee property law adverse to Israeli citizens." 6
Military Order No. 78 transferred management of property formerly
administered by the Egyptian Director General to a "Commissioner ofJews'
Property." The Commissioner refused to re-vest title to the lands at his
disposal in their original Jewish owners."1 7 Instead, he administered the
property as usufructuary in compliance with the 1907 Hague Conventions.
C. Israeli Land Acquisitions
In order to circumvent the legal limits on the seizure of Palestinian
property, the Israeli military frequently deprived Palestinians of their right
to an appeal. Timely notification of intended property confiscations was
crucial to the appeals process. The Israeli military nevertheless issued
closure (of property) orders in the haphazard form of unnumbered and
otherwise unorganized papers, or by charging unreliable Arab village elders
(mukhtars) with the task of notifying the landholder personally." 8
114 Issued inJune 1948, OrderNo. 25 was amended in 1956 to include the property ofArabs living
in Israel. For the most part, however, Palestinians were fleeing to Gaza after the 1948 hostilities, not
abandoning their property for Israeli land. Consequently, the original thrust of the Order (i.e. the
confiscation ofJewish property) was largely intact throughout the period ofEgyptian administration. See
Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israeli-Palestinian Settlement, 89
AM.J. INT'L L. 295, 304-5 (1995) (discussing the provisions of Order No. 25).
115 Whereas the Israeli military order was based on a rationale of absenteeism, the Egyptian
order's sphere of application and substantive provisions suggest it was based on an enemy rationale. The
fate of enemy property is "determined only pursuant to the making of a peace treaty." Id. at 304-5, 308.
116 See id. at 314-17 (describing Military Order No. 78 and its application).
" Although Article 9(a) of Military Order No. 78 authorizes the Commissioner to transfer the
property, or its proceeds, to its original owners, or to their successors 'in his absolute discretion, in the
time and manner he sees fit," that power has never been exercised. Id. at 314.
118 Military Order No. 161, Order Concerning Interpretations (Additional Instrnctions 2), issued on
November 5, 1967, authorizes, along with its supplements, any of the following types of notice: radio
announcements, publication in the Area Commander's office, or communication via mukhtars. See
Dajani, supra note 44, at 93 (quoting Military Order No. 161 and explaining the disorderly enactment and
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Consequently, Palestinians were rarely informed of the expropriation of
their lands before the opportunity to file an appeal had lapsed.
Appeals were usually futile in any case since the laws, and the courts
charged with enforcing them, operated in the military government's favor.
By the early 1990's, the Israeli military government had acquired over thirty
percent of the Gaza Strip's land area." 9 Palestinians lost additional land to
sales between Arab landholders and private Israeli land development
companies and individuals."2°
Despite the apparent lack of restraint on the Israeli occupation of Gaza,
the military government operated, to a certain extent, within the sphere of
international laws and policies.' 2' It could not contravene the prohibitions
of the 1907 Hague Convention after the Elon Moreh decision. The
enforcement of pre-occupation law, albeit deliberately misconstrued, was
actually in accord with the mandates of international law."2 The Israeli
Supreme Court's most important holding in both the Beit EI-Toubas and the
Elon Moreh cases essentially validated the provisions of the 1907 Hague
Convention. It declared Israeli control of land in the Occupied Territories
temporary. 123
V. 2005: PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
In August 2005, the Israeli government finally complied with the
constraints of belligerent occupation. Israeli forces withdrew from the Gaza
Strip. The PNA, charged with rebuilding the Palestinian nation, now has
the opportunity to intervene in the historical dispossession of Palestinian
property.
enforcement of military orders in the Occupied Territories); see also Howlett, supra note 71, at 143-44
(describing the ineffectiveness of relaying notice through a mukhtar).
119 Bisharat, supra note 16, at 526.
12 Id. at 542-44.
121 In Regional Council of Gaza Beach v. Knesset, the Israeli Supreme Court affirmed the application
of the customary international law of belligerent occupation to the Occupied Territories. See
Disengagement from Gaza - Legal Issues, Chatham House,
http//www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdl'research/il/ILP200605.pdf#search=%22disengagement%20fro
m%20Gaza%20legal%20issues%22 (last visited on September 27, 2006) (quoting the Court's holding in
the case, cited as HCJ 1661/05). But see Dajani, supra note 44, at 107 (arguing there was a defacto
application of Israeli law in, and a defacto annexation of, the Occupied Territories).
12 See Hague Convention IV. art. 43, supra note 84 (requiring the occupying State to exercise its
authority "while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country").
123 See, e.g., Bisharat, supra note 16, at 535-36 (explaining the holdings of the Israeli Supreme
Court in both cases); see also Hague Convention IV. art. 55, supra note 84 (indicating the temporary
nature of the occupying State's authority by limiting its powers to the administration and safeguarding
of occupied properties "in accordance with the rules of usufruct").
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A. Current State ofAffairs
In addition to the numerous United Nations Resolutions recognizing
"the right to self-determination without external interference" and "the right
to national independence and sovereignty" of the Palestinian people, 124 more
than ninety countries recognized the "State of Palestine" after its
proclamation by the Palestinian National Council in 1988.125 International
recognition of the Palestinian's right of return is due to the "inadmissibility
of the acquisition of territory by war." 26 Although the Israeli "Disengage-
ment Law" calls for Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in the interest
of State security rather than international acceptability, it nevertheless
provided for Israel's compliance with the demands of its world neighbors.
The law mandates the removal of 8,500 Israeli settlers from 21 Gaza
settlements.' 27 Upon completion of withdrawal, the disengagement plan
specifies that "there shall no longer be any permanent presence of Israeli
security forces in the areas of Gaza Strip territory which have been
evacuated." 128 However, the plan also includes the following provisions: 129
124 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236"reiterates the customary law of the right
of return" specifically in terms of the quoted excerpts. GA Res. 3236 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/3236
(Nov. 22,1974). United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 1397 affirm the same. U.N.
Question of Palestine, supra note 2, at 121.
1 For a list of the 94 countries who recognized the State of Palestine after its proclamation by
the Palestinian National Council meeting in Algiers in November 1988, see Government: International
Recognition of the State of Palestine, httpV/www.pna.gov.ps/Government/gov/recognition-of the
State_ofPalestine.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2005) (on file with author).
126 Lord Caradon, the principal author ofUnited Nations Resolution 242, the primary resolution
demanding Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, explained the Resolution's "overriding
principle" as quoted. U.N. Question of Palestine, supra note 2, at 122.
127 The "Disengagement Law" provided for the removal of 600 settlers from four West Bank
settlements in addition to withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Both the Israeli Parliament (the Knesset) and
the Israeli Supreme Court approved the law. E.g. Israeli Court Backs Pullout Plan, BBC NEWS, June 9,
2005, available at http'//news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/middleeast/4075736.stm; but c. Margaret
Coker, Israeli High Court Clears Legal Hurdlefor Gaza Pullout, COX NEWS SERVICE, THE OXFORD PRESS,
June 10, 2005, available at http://www.oxfordpress.conVnews/content/shared/news/world/stories/06/
10_ISRAELRULING.html (stating the number of settlers to be removed from Gaza is 8,500).
128 See Disengagement from Gaza - Legal Issues, supra note 121 (quoting the provisions of the
disengagement plan from the Israeli Cabinet Resolution ofJune 6, 2004).
129 The border area with Egypt is an additional issue the Palestinian Authority claims negates
actual cessation of occupation. The disengagement plan originally provided for Israeli military control
of the "Philadelphi Route" between Egypt and Gaza. See Disengagement from Gaza - Legal Issues, supra
note 121 (quoting the provisions of the disengagement plan from the Israeli Cabinet Resolution ofJune
6,2004); see also The Gaza 'Disengagement' is not an end to Occupation: Occupation of the Gaza Strip will continue
in both its legal and physicalform, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, PCHR Disengagement Fact Sheet
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1. The State of Israel will guard and monitor the external land perimeter
of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza air
space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the sea off the coast
of the Gaza Strip. 3°
2. The Gaza Strip shall be demilitarized and shall be devoid of
weaponry, the presence of which does not accord with the Israeli-Palestinian
agreements.
13
'
3. The State of Israel reserves its fundamental right of self-defense, both
preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force, in
respect of threats emanating from the Gaza Strip.
132
The PNA President, Dr. Mahmoud Abbas, criticized the seemingly
victorious coup for the Palestinians. He believes "the legal status of the areas
slated for evacuation has not changed. " 133  Amongst other things, the
construction of buffer zones,13 and control of the air, sea, and land borders,
has led both Palestinians and some members of the Israeli government to
deny the claim that Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip has ended. 31 An
American Ambassador frowned on the unilateral disengagement, saying the
Gaza Strip "today was the largest fresh air prison."
136
No. 1, http-//www.pchrgaza.org /files/ campaigns /english/ gazWFact%2OSheet%201%20-%20Not%
20an%2End%20to%200ccupation.pdf (last visited September 27, 2006); see also MINISTRY OF
HOUSING, PALESTINIAN NAT'L AUTHORITY, MEDIUM TERM DEv. PLAN 247-248 (2005) [MTDP]
(describing the disengagement plan and the official Palestinian position), available at http//www.mop.
gov.psen/docs archivemop%5CMEDIUM%20TERM%20DEVELOPMENT%20PLAN%202005-
2007.asp. In October, an agreement was reached to transfer control of the Rafiach crossing between
Egypt and Gaza to the Egyptian and Palestinian authorities as long as European Union monitors continue
to inspect the crossing, and report to Israel. IsraelAllows EU Presence on Gaza-Egypt Border, IsraelNational
News.com, Oct. 31, 2005, available at http;'/www.israelnn.com /print.php3?.what=news&id =92100.
13 See Disengagement from Gaza - Legal Issues, supra note 121 (quoting the provisions of the
disengagement plan from the June 6, 2004 Israeli Cabinet Resolution).
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Dore Gold, Legal Acrobatics: The Palestinian Claim That Gaza is Still "Occupied" Even After Israel
Withdraws, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 5 Jerusalem Issue Brief no. 3, Aug. 26, 2005, available at
http;//www.jcpa.org/brief/briefD05-3.htm (quoting the President's statement as published on the
Palestinian Authority's Ministry of Foreign Affairs website).
134 Israel to Build Security Buffer Zone in Gaza Strip, CRlonline, Oct. 30, 2005,
httpV/en.chinabroadcast.cn/2239/2005-10-30/64@279265.htm.
135 See The Gaza 'Disengagement' is not an end to Occupation, supra note 129 (citing and quoting
members of the Israeli government who say occupation will not end).
136 United Nations Latin American and Caribbean Meeting on Question of Palestine, VHeadline.com,
Dec. 15, 2005, http'J/www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=47434 (quoting Edward L. Peck). Other
than the obvious implications of continued occupation, Palestinians also suffered by losing their jobs
without compensation during the disengagement. The Israeli government promised Israeli settlers in
Gaza between $150,000 and $400,000 for leaving their homes during disengagement, including
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In spite of the debate over actual disengagement, the PNA is taking
action to rebuild the Gaza Strip. From 1996 to 1998, the Ministry of
Planning and International Cooperation outlined the guidelines for future
land-use in a Regional Plan for the Gaza Governorates ("RPGG"), which
operates in conjunction with the PNA's 2005 Medium Term Development Plan
("MTDP"). 137 The PNA divided Gaza's 360 km2 of land into the following
five governorates: Gaza, Khan Yunis, Rafah, Deir al-Balah, and North
Gaza. 13' Gaza and Khan Yunis are to become the Gaza Strip's two major
cities. In the fourteen urban centers envisaged throughout Gaza as hubs of
industrial activities, private and public services, and administration, con-
struction has already begun.' 39 Even so, the many people laying claim to the
limited land available continue to obstruct the implementation of the
RPGG.
Approximately 1.3 to 1.4 million people are currently living in Gaza's
governorates, making the Strip one of the most densely populated places on
earth."4  Most Palestinians did not desert their lands during the 1967
confrontation between Israel and its Arab neighbors as they had during the
creation of the Israeli State. 14 1 Many of the nearly four hundred thousand
Palestinians living in Gaza after the Egyptian defeat were, in fact, refugees
expelled from Palestine in 1948.142 By the time Israeli troops left Gaza in
2005, refugees comprised nearly eighty percent of the population.' 43 To
settle the refugees' land claims, and those of Gaza's native population, the
PNA established land tribunals.
In spite of these major changes, some Palestinians feel that "this is a new
colonialism" because "they [the Palestinian government] are stealing our
compensation for Israeli's who were working in the Gaza Strip. The 3,200 Palestinians who were
working for the Israelis who left, taking their jobs with them, were given nothing. Amira Hass,Jewish
Settlers Receive Hundreds of Thousands in Compensation for Leaving Gaza while Palestinians Working for Them
Get Nothing, DEMocRAcYNOW.ORG, Aug. 16, 2005, http/www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=
05/08/16/1326221.
137 MTDP, supra note 129, at 250. The MTDP was presented by the Palestinian Authority as a
framework for the development process.
138 Id. at 251.
139 Id. at 252.
140 Id. at 251; Gaza Strip, WIKIPEDIA, http/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gaza-strip (last visited
September 27. 2006).
141 Whereas the majority of Palestinians left Palestine in 1948, less than half abandoned their
property in 1967. E.g. Howlett, supra note 71, at 131; Bisharat, supra note 16, at 524.
142 Nearly 250,000 refugees fled to the Gaza Strip in 1948, almost tripling the population at the
time. The 1967 population estimate is based on a September 1967 census. Dajani, supra note 44, at 71.
143 Id.
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land."' The accusation stems from the fact that the Palestinian Land
Authority only recognizes property rights recorded in the land registry. As
a result, the Palestinians' customary rights, traditionally identified on the
basis of oral or written testimony by co-villagers, or by tax payments, are
once again being compromised. Additionally, registered property, which
only accounts for between four and nine percent of the land in Gaza, 4 ' can
be confiscated if necessary to further the RPGG.
Two former Israeli colonies, Gush Katif and Morag, illustrate the
differing fates of land under the PNA. The sand-dune areas in the south,
where Gush Katif is located, contain valuable aquifers and landscapes. The
RPGG provides that these areas will be integrated into Palestine under
environmental protection against urban development. Morag, on the other
hand, is located on the main road between Khan Yunis and Rafah. It is
earmarked for use as a housing development or a research facility.
Morag's history illustrates one man's serial dispossession. Mohammed
Duhair purchased land in Morag from the Egyptians in 1961. Nine years
later, the Israeli government declared Morag a closed military zone,
displacing the Duhairs, a clan with about 2,000 members. Having lost his
land to the Israelis in 1970, Mohammed Duhair is losing it again in 2005 to
the Palestinians. His property will be appropriated despite his land deed
from the Egyptian administration.
Freih Abu Meddein, director of the Palestinian Land Authority,
defended the appropriation's incongruence with the MTDP, which states
that "private land will be returned to the original owners, while public land
will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Land Authority." He
said, "[The Palestinian Land Authority] will only give back the land if it
doesn't serve a public use, like streets, schools, or any assets left behind by
the Israelis." In short, whether registered or not, property rights are as they
have always been: subordinate to the state's interest.
According to the Palestinian Foreign Minister Nasser al-Kidwa, "unless
a range of problems in the Gaza Strip is resolved, it will turn into a huge
prison camp."'" The Palestinian Land Authority headquarters in Gaza,
which preserves documents related to Palestinian land ownership, has been
14 Johnston, supra note 12 (quoting MatarJumaa Duheir, a Palestinian unsuccessfully petitioning
for the return of his land on property allocated for a housing project).
14 El Deeb, supra note 12 (quoting an estimate by Palestinian officials).
14 Gaza May Turn Into Prison Camp - Palestinian Leader, REUTERS, Oct. 31, 2005, available at
http'//www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/SEO322706.htm. With respect to violence specifically fueled
by land disputes, a Palestinian land official echoed his concerns, saying "there are a lot of confrontations
on the evacuated lands ... they [the squatters] are there... every day we are in contact with the police
and national security." Johnston, supra note 12.
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under attack since 2004.147 In 2005, gunmen stormed the building,
demanding settlement land as compensation for helping force Israeli
withdrawal. 148 A senior land registrar met their demands with one of his
own. A sign outside his office said, "Any claims to Government land should
be settled with the head of the authority."'49
Of the people attempting to settle, most fail to reclaim their land.
Undaunted, they vow to keep fighting for it, saying, "We came out from
Jews' [occupation] unscathed ... Now we won't let the Arabs take it. " "
Unsuccessful claimants usually resort to squatting on land, pitching tents in
a strategy reminiscent of the tactics employed by the people of Barrat
Qisarya during the British Mandate.'I Unfortunately, like the past residents
of Barrat Qisarya, present day Palestinians will lose the lawfare by fighting
with old evidence of de facto property rights.
B. The Revival of Islam in Palestinian Law
It is clear from the laws drafted by the Palestinian Legislative Council
that the State embraces Islam. The Basic Law enacted in 2002 specifies that
"Islam is the official religion in Palestine," and "the principles of Islamic
Shari'a shall be the main source of legislation."152 What remains to be seen
is the extent of moderation in the Shari'a actually enforced.
1. ISLAMIST FUNDAMENTALISM
The traditional Islamic precept of Arab unity, keeping Muslim lands
whole, is both in line and at odds with Palestinian laws. Establishing a great
Islamic State is Hamas' main goal and the duty of the Palestinian people per
the first article of their Basic Law. 5 3 "To sum up," explains Mahmoud A-
147 PCHR Calls Upon the Palestinian Authoity to InventgateAttackAgainst LandAuthrity Headquarters,
Press Release No. 37/2004, Palestinian Centre For Human Rights, Mar. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/PressR/English/2004/31-2004.htm.
148 El Deeb, supra note 12.
149 Id.
ISO Id.
151 After the Israeli Supreme Court decision, and prior to the final settlement with the PJCA,
residents ofBarrat Qisarya fortified their presence during the 1930's by cultivating, digging, and building
wells. Forman & Kedar, supra note 55, at 531.
152 BAsic LAW art. 4 (Palestine) available at http;//jurist.law.pitt.edu /world/palestbasic.htm.
153 Id. art. I ("Arab Unity is an objective which the Palestinian People shall work to achieve");
Mahmoud A-Zahhar said the main goal of Hamas is "to establish a great Islamic state, be it pan-Arabic
or pan-Islamic." Yaniv Berman, E&dusive Interview with Hamas Leader, THE MEDIA LINE, Sept. 22,2005,
http'//www.themedialine.org/news/print newsdetaii.asp?NewslD= 11354 (from the transcript of an
RIGHT OF RETURN
Zahhar, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, "the Islamic and traditional
views reject the notion of establishing an independent Palestinian State.""5 4
The draft Constitution, however, recognizes the sovereignty of Palestine as
an independent state in addition to the "Arab Palestinian" nature of its
people.' The draft Constitution also calls for a free market economic order
in Palestine, 15 6 and protects private property.5 7
While the draft Constitution suggests the government is broadly
construing Shari'a, the State imposes restrictions which validate the general
view of Arab constitutional documents as "insincere promises of rights,
freedoms, and democratic processes. " 158 For example, the MTDP aims to
reconnect the Palestinian economy to the Arab world by, inter alia,
constraining economic arrangements with Israel.'59 In addition, the draft
Constitution stipulates that "the law shall regulate the conditions of transfer
of ownership of real estate to foreigners."' 6° The regulations are usually
applied strictly to prohibit the sale of land to Jews. In fact, Freih Abu
Middein said "[the sale of Palestinian land to Jews] is a very dangerous act"
when he served as a PalestinianJustice Minister, adding that "there has been
a decision to ban it by putting anyone who sells even a centimeter on swift
trial and to seek the death penalty against them."' 6' Considering the history
ofJewish encroachment on Palestinian lands, and the Palestinian pledge to
maintain the unity of Palestinian property, the regulations are somewhat
justified. Still, threatening deadly force and restricting economic trans-
actions should not be the first actions of a state supposedly committed to a
free market economy.
The draft Constitution's purported protection of private property is also
dubious. Like the principles related to safeguarding al-mal in Islam, the
government recognizes the necessity of wealth, and pledges to provide for
interview with Mahmoud A-Zahhar posted by The Media Line).
154 Berman, supra note 153 (quoting Mahmoud A-Zahhar).
155 Whereas the draft Constitution repeatedly refers to a "Palestinian Arab people," and
specifically says that "the Palestinian people are a part of the Arab and Islamic nations," it also stipulates
as follows: "Palestine is an independent state with complete sovereignty that cannot be conceded."
PALESTINE CONSTITUTION art. 4-5 available at http;//www.pcpsr.org/domestic/2001/constel.html.
156 PALESTINE CONSTITUTION art. 21, supra note 155.
157 PALESTINE CONSTITUTION art. 49, supra note 155.
158 Zaha Hassan, The Palestinian Constitution and the Geneva Accord: The Prospects for Palestinian
Constitutionalism, 16 FLA.J. INT'L L. 897, 919 (2004).
19 MTDP, supra note 129, at 215.
160 PALESTINE CONSTITUTION art. 50, supra note 155.
161 Statements by Senior Palestinian Authority Officials Concerning Sale of Land to Jews, Israel
Government Press Office, May 211997, available at httpV//www.likud.nVviol0l.html (quoting Freih Abu
Middein during an interview with Agence France Presse on May 5, 1997).
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the realization of"economic growth and social justice" amongst its people. 62
Having identified agriculture as the primary sector for economic
development in Palestine,'6 the MTDP proposes to "protect" it by
reclaiming and regulating cultivable lands."6 Most cultivable lands,
however, have been appropriated by the State. Even supposedly private
property is being appropriated by the State. Without property, the people
can not achieve economic prosperity, and will forever be subordinate to the
State. Moreover, indefinite property rights constrict even the State's
economic development. While vesting title to all property in the
government may have been in accordance with Islam as interpreted by the
Ottomans, it is unlikely such an interpretation holds true today.
2. ISLAMIC MODERATION
Social empowerment is a critical difference between strict interpretations
of Shari'a and more moderate views. 65 Islamic states adopting the notion
that God alone, not His people, nor their will, reigns sovereign leave little
leeway for an individual to exercise control over property in a Muslim state.
Authority for adopting collective decisions, however, can be found in the
Qur'an'66 and the hadiths. 67 Islam, therefore, does not necessarily prohibit
vesting Muslim property in the hands of individual Muslims if such is their
consensus (ima'). Difficulties emerge when the notion of an Islamic nation
subsumes individualism at the personal and the state levels.
Mahmoud A-Zahhar erroneously equates the successful establishment
of a European Union with the potential for creating a Great Islamic State.' 68
At the state level, the difficulty inherent in reconciling the differences
amongst the many Muslim states is not in dispute. After all, if Egypt,
16 PALESTINE CONSTITUTION art. 51, supra note 155 ("The state shall protect the private
economic activity of individuals in order to realize economic growth and social justice").
16 MTDP, supra note 129, at 204.
164 Id. at 227.
165 "No adequate machinery ... is provided by the legal theory to protect the individual against
the [Islamic] State ... The problem, therefore, which today confronts those Muslim countries whose
aim is the establishment ofa system of guaranteed individual liberties is no small one. For the possibility
of such a system is denied by the fundamental doctrines of the Shari'a itself" Coulson, supra note 27, at
59-60.
166 The Quran 42:38 states, "Whose affairs are a matter of consultation." See The Muslim World
and Democracy, Islam Online, July 5, 2004, available at http://www.islamonline.coni/cgi-
bin/newservices/spot_full story.asp?service id=781 (affirming the notion that decisions in Islam come
through consensus, 'Yma).
167 The Prophet Muhammad said, "My people will not agree on a mistake." See id.
168 See Berman, supra note 153 (referencing Mahmoud A-Zahhar's comments regarding the
"European example").
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Jordan, and Palestine were so similar, the pretext that absorbing Palestinian
refugees would harm their case for the return to Palestine would likely have
been abandoned. A-Zahhar believes that since European countries were able
to live with their differences in a harmonious Union, so too can Arab
countries. With such divergence between moderate and fundamental
interpretations of Islam, however, they cannot. As explained by Ashirbek
Muminov, a researcher on Islam at the Kazakh Oriental Studies Institute,
"[i]n each place Islam has lots of local peculiarities and to gather all that in
one place is very difficult." 169
At the very least, all European countries can agree on their individual
sovereignty and the individual rights of their people. The European Union,
therefore, operates pursuant to laws adopted by agreement amongst the
member states. Islamic countries, however, have yet to agree on a
framework to interpret Islam (whether by popular consensus, or solely by
reference to the divine word).' 70 As a result, at the personal level, the rights
of Europeans are protected by their laws whereas in some Arab countries the
existence of individual rights remains questionable.
As for the Palestinians, their government has taken some action in
accordance with moderate interpretations of Shari'a. The democratic
election of Palestinian presidents is in accord with the democratic system
that both the Basic Law and the draft Constitution claim rules the
Palestinians.' 17 With respect to property, some of the restrictions imposed
on its use, such as prohibiting its monopolization,172 are born of Islamic
values which do not necessarily harm private property interests. Moreover,
the PNA recognizes the importance of conclusive property rights to private
investors, and is collaborating with international organizations to institute
legal reform to that effect.' 73
For example, Financial Markets International, Inc. ("FMI") is working
with Palestinian lawyers, bankers, the construction industry, and the
Palestinian Land Authority to clear title to lands held by irrevocable power
169 Id.
170 "In early December, [Jordan's King] Abdullah told the 56-member Organization of the
Islamic Conference that failure to establish a clear framework to interpret Islam leaves the door open for
radicals to strengthen their ranks." See Brian Murphy, Militants, Moderates Battle for Words, MIAMI
HERALD, Dec. 30, 2005, at 28A.
171 BASIC LAW art. 5,supra note 153; PALESTINE CONSTITUTION art. 5, art.10-11,supra note 155.
172 PALESTINE CONSTITUTION art. 20, supra note 155 ("Natural resources in Palestine are the
property of the Palestinian people. They shall exercise their sovereignty over them and do not permit
their monopolization").
173 MTDP, supra note 129, at 219-220 (describing the legal reform program of the Palestinian
Authority and the World Bank).
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of attorney ("IPA"). IPAs are like executory contracts to convey land.' 74
Since they pertain to future land transactions, the property's owner does not
technically change until the future conveyance. Therefore, IPAs were
unregistered. Based on race statutes from American property law, 175 FMI's
solution aims to develop the Palestinian mortgage finance industry by
settling titles conveyed via IPA. Still, settling title to property is futile if the
State continues to reclaim it.
C. Building on Shari'a's Past
[T] he failure to protect a set of interests as exclusive property rights
leaves the people who assert those interests vulnerable to others.
Both the creation and the failure to create a property right leaves
people to harm, either at the hands of the state or at the hands of
other persons. A central question, therefore, is how our legal system
goes about defining and allocating property rights. 76
As noted by ProfessorJoseph Singer, the loss of Palestinian property is
in some ways due to the failure of Palestinian laws to protect it. Of course,
the incompatibility of Shari'a with the Western jurisprudential concepts
introduced by foreign administrations resulted in the loss of some property
rights. Also, conquest, and the failure of international law to protect against
it, contributed to the Palestinians' demise. Shari'a nevertheless withstood
each conquest, yet failed to protect the property rights of Palestinians. It
must, therefore, have some shortcomings of its own.
1. WHAT IS "WESTERN"?
Whether referring to Western norms of secular governance, democratic
governance, or both, Islamic rule is not so fundamentally different. For
example, the United States is a secular democratic state and Israel is ajewish
democratic state, yet true separation of church and state does not necessarily
exist in either nation. After all, religious beliefs prompted many of the first
Western settlers in America to colonize the United States. Still today,
174 See generally Howard DeNike & Khalil Ansara, Mortgage Finance, Tenacious Inquiry, and Hernando
de Soto, Financial Markets International, Inc. Newsletter, Spring 2003, available at http://www.fmi-
inc.net/dmtspring_2003body.htm.
175 As per the suggestion of Financial Markets International, Inc., the following system was
developed: "[e]very holder of an IPA will be required to file a copy in a central registry maintained in
the local Tabu. In the event of disputes, the claimant who filed first will win." Id.
176 Kedar, supra note 6, at 998 (quoting Joseph Singer).
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George W. Bush's politically correct "happy holiday" cards were purchased
with American currency marked "In God We Trust."
Whether a true democracy exists is also unclear. George W. Bush is not
the first American President to have lost the popular vote. As for Israel, even
Mahmoud A-Zahhar seized on the fact that supposedly democratic countries
do not necessarily follow the democratic way. When asked whether or not
Hamas will recognize the State of Israel since the PNA has, and democratic
governments normally uphold the agreements of their predecessors, A-
Zahhar replied:
I'll ask you a question. When the Labor Party signed the Oslo
agreement, the Likud Party was in the opposition. Did it [later on]
accept the Oslo agreement? So the Likud was obliged to follow it,
but it did not accept it, nor did it recognize it. And when it rose to
power it completely terminated the Oslo agreement. The same is
with us. 77
Conquest, and the rules that define its methodology, further
demonstrates the fact that Western and Muslim nations are not so different.
Like the Palestinians' struggle with the state for private ownership of some
land, Justice Marshall recognized the incompatibility of absolute title to
American soil in both the state and the Indians. Across the globe, the
solution is the same- ownership is vested in the state which can revoke the
natives' right of occupancy at will. Moreover, all reason that "[t] hese claims
have been maintained and established... by the sword."'79
Western and Ottoman administrators of Palestine were, as might be
expected, also alike in many ways. During the British Mandate, Zionist
colonizers defended their acquisition of Palestinian territory like the
Mandate government defended its appropriation of Palestinian property,
177 Berman, supra note 153 (quoted in the transcript ofan interview with Mahmoud A-Zahhar, the
leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip).
178 "All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the crown, subject only to the Indian right
of occupancy, and recognize the absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible
with an absolute and complete title in the Indians."Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588.
179 The British government, which was then our government, and whose rights
have passed to the United States, asserted title to all the lands occupied by Indians, within the
chartered limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a limited sovereignty over them, and
the exclusive right of extinguishing title which occupancy gave to them. These claims have
been maintained and established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the sword. The title
to a vast portion of the lands we now hold, originates in them.
Id. at 588-589. Like the Americans, the Ottomans acquired title to land in battle (what Islam refers to
asjihad by the sword).
2006]
38 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:1
with utility theories first advanced by English philosophers.'8S By depicting
Palestine as a sparsely inhabited waste land faltering under the rule of Arab
feudal lords, taking the land and putting it to better use seemed justified."' 1
The Ottoman Land Code proves Islam also promoted the maximization of
land use. In accordance withJohn Locke's theories on the origins of private
property, property rights in the Ottoman period were acquired by cultivating
the land.
Even the military orders passed by the Israeli administration evinced
commonalities with the Ottoman Land Code. Regulations protecting
religious lands for their "historical" value,'82 for instance, declared divine
land inalienable just like the waqf category of property. To this day, the
concept of sacred religious property gives rise to competing interests in
Palestine. Israelis are currently objecting to the demolition of synagogues
in the Gaza Strip,'1 3 and Hamas has always objected to a Jewish presence
anywhere in Palestine."8
2. WHAT IS THE RIGHT OF RETURN?
Reliance on international law for the return of private property is
erroneous in two major respects. First, the right of return in international
law does not equate to individual rights of repossession.8 5 It is the law of
180 See Forman & Kedar, supra note 55, at 508-11 (describing both British and Jewish colonizing
interests, and explaining that "bringing European "development" and "progress" to indigenous
populations was an important underpinning of the British colonial ethos").
181 See Bisharat, supra note 16, at 481-91 (examining the origins and purpose of"the image ofarab
feudalism"); see also Dajani, supra note 44 (elaborating on the notion of"arab feudalism").
182 The unnumbered Military Regulation Concerning Antiquities, enacted on Jan. 1, 1985, and the
Military Order Concerning Antiquities Law, first passed on May 1, 1986 (amended many times thereafter),
authorized the expropriation ofJewish historical and religious sites in the Occupied Territories. Dajani,
supra note 44, at 105.
183 Julie Stahl, Gaza Synagogues Could Become 'Point of Contention,' Israeli Official Says,
CNSNEwS.coM, Sept. 6, 2005, available at http'/www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page
=%5CForeignBureaus%5Carchive%5C200509%CFOR20050906d.html; Palestinian Centre for Human
Rights Condemns Israel for not Destroying Synagogues, Press Release No.110/2005, Palestinian Centre for
Human Rights, Sept. 20, 2005, available at http'//www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=26937.
184 See Dajani, supra note 44 (describing Hamas' contention that all of Palestine is inalienable
waqJ).
185 A complete examination of the international right of return is beyond the scope of this paper.
An analysis of the right would entail a study of its historical application in postwar arrangements. The
treatment ofboth enemy and abandoned property after the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-1922, World War
II, the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, the Turkish invasion ofCyprus in 1974, and after
the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, to name a few, illustrates the fact that
international practice rarely recognizes the rights of owners to regain possession of their property. See
generally Benvenisti & Zamir, supra note 114.
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each sovereign nation that must secure the individual property rights of its
citizens once they are afforded a right of return. Second, sovereign nations
are not bound by the rules of international law. There is no global police
force effectively enforcing international policy, and actions taken by nations
which happen to be in accord with international rules were not necessarily
motivated by them.
Consider lawfare for example. One might say present day imperialism
is achieved through the courts of law given international disdain for
traditional warfare. There are, however, other benefits to waging war with
words rather than swords.'8s In addition to minimizing the cost of conquest
in terms of human casualties and maintaining and supplying troops, lawfare
conceals the expropriation of land while cloaking it with legitimacy. This in
turn quells those who are occupied, satisfies the human rights activists
among the occupiers, and fortifies the occupation's future.
The Israeli government, like all others, is no stranger to ulterior
motives. 1" There is some force in the idealist argument that Israeli
disengagement from Gaza was motivated by a desire to comply with
international policy, or, alternatively, by the jurisprudence of regret that
compels nations to atone for past injustices. Even the Israeli Supreme Court
acknowledged that "Israel is not an isolated island."18  Perhaps the Court
recently forbade the Israeli Government from discriminating between Arab
and Jewish citizens in their access to public land because "[Israel] is a
member of an international system." "
Many will argue, however, that the recent emergence of Israeli
sympathies towards Palestinian interests is a ruse designed to obscure
intensified assimilation of Palestinian territory.' 9° Current acceleration of
186 See generally Bisharat, supra note 16 (arguing that "the use of law under such circumstances
[during colonization/occupation] reflects the needs of dominant colonial groups to maintain internal
cohesion and morale, and, to a lesser extent, to gain international approval for their policies"); see also
Kedar, supra note 6, at 928-931 (describing the justificatory arguments supporting lawfare, and its
benefits).
187 See Bisharat, supra note 16, at 547-52 (discussing alternative explanations for Israel's legally
oriented approach to land acquisition as well as specific instances when the Israeli government ignored
international law).
,s8 HCJ 4764/04, Physicians for Human Rights etc. v. IDF, available at
http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=21004 (last visited on Sept. 28, 2006) (quotingthe Israeli Supreme
Court decision in HCJ 5592/02, Yassin v. Commander of the Kziot Military Camp).
189 Id. See also Kedar, supra note 6, at 999-1000 (describing the holding of HCJ 6698/05 Kaadan
v. Katzir, as the possible "beginning of a shift in the attitude of Israeli law toward its Arab minority in
connection to land rights").
190 The Palestinian Centre for Human Rights contends the Israeli government openly admitted
the purpose of the disengagement plan was to create "facts on the ground" in the West Bank. PCHR
Disengagement Fact Sheet No. 2, Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,
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Israeli settlement in the West Bank, accompanied by lengthening of the wall
separating Israel from the Occupied Palestinian Territories ("Wall"),
substantiates the claim. 9' These tactics violate international law since the
"occupied" West Bank is supposed to be returned to the Palestinians, not
further removed from them. As for enlarging the Wall, the International
Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion in 2004 condemning the
construction of a barrier wall, let alone its expansion.'
92
Ultimately, the world at large frowning upon a state will only force its
hand so far. Occupation inevitably results in the loss of property rights,
whether by manipulating pre-occupation laws, by creating new laws to
supersede them, or simply by developing irrefutable "facts on the ground"
of adverse possession. Curtailing the dispossession of property is
nevertheless possible. If the Ottoman Land Code better secured the private
property rights of Palestinians, and if the Palestinians had private property
to be secured in the first place, they would not be so vulnerable.
3. WHAT CAN BE DONE WITH SHARI'A?
In Gaza, Shari'a should be improved, not replaced, in order to better
secure the property rights of Palestinians. Western law is not necessarily a
different or better alternative, and, more importantly, Islamic governance
appears to coincide with the general will of the people.193 Not only is it
more "democratic" to institute legal reform in a manner embraced by the
native population, but, historically, it is more successful.194
http://www.pchrgaza.org/files/campaigns/english/gaza/Fact%20Sheet%20No%202%20-
%20the%20real%20story.pdf (last visited Dec. 20,2005) ("In the framework of the disengagement plan,
Israel will strengthen its control over those same areas in the Land of Israel which will constitute an
inseparable part of the State of Israel in any future agreement" (quoting former Israeli Prime Minister,
Ariel Sharon)).
191 For a detailed account of the expansion of settler activities and the Wall in the West Bank, see
id.; See also James Brooks, To Become an Occupier, AL-JAZEERAH, Nov. 10, 2005, available at
http. /www.aljazeerah.info/Opinion%20editorials/2005%20pinion%20Editorials/November/10%20
o/To%20Becom%20an%20Occupier%2OBy%20James%20Brooks.htm.
192 Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, A/ES-10/273 (July 13, 2004), available at
http;//domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/1ce874ab1832a53e852570bb006dfaf6/05b3c70f2d9e Ie2685256ed200
6dfbl2!OpenDocument.
193 The demands of Christian Palestinians and other minorities are not considered since the
majority of the Palestinian population is Muslim.
194 See Ahmad, supra note 29 (explaining "that historical experience has shown that liberty in
general is best promoted when the institutions advancing it conform to the local cultural milieu" with
specific examples and logical reasoning).
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Officially, the PNA agrees modernizing Shari'a is preferable and
necessary. 195 The PNA President said the PNA has "... a plan: that all the
lands [appropriated] in Gaza be used for public good."'9 If so, that plan
should be to return the land to the Palestinians, and to better define the laws
related to its ownership. Given Islam's favorable disposition towards
environments of economic prosperity, where the wealth of Muslims is well
protected, only then will the public be best served.
A. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
The PNA's present allocation of property rights endangers the welfare
of its citizens, and the welfare of the State itself. Negative economic
implications aside, vesting absolute title to all property in the State facilitates
abusive expropriation by foreign conquerors. The Elon Moreh decision
proves private property is one of the few assets safeguarded during
belligerent occupation. Treating it like any other asset almost encourages its
confiscation.
Hamas' vision of the Great Islamic State, a sort of corporation whose
shareholders (citizens) have temporary interests in the form of revocable use
rights, illustrates the danger. Such an uncertain structure is necessarily
unstable, and can only work if each member of the State protects the State's
shared interests. Reliance on fellow Arab nations, however, was historically
of no avail to the Palestinians. Currently, even the MTDP suggests little has
changed.97
The Gaza Strip's precarious situation makes the PNA's duty to distribute
private property all the more pressing. Domestically, the PNA's despotic
hoarding of property rights engenders a hostility among Palestinians that
195 MTDP, supra note 129, at 219.
1% El Deeb, supra note 12 (quoting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas).
'97 Although the MTDP describes a number of helpful donations made by Arab countries, it
repeatedly harps on the fact that export-driven growth is needed, but has not been achieved, and will not
be achieved, "unless Arab countries take effective measures to increase Palestinian access to their
markets." The Government explains that "[it] hope[s] Arab countries will take measures to facilitate
Palestinian access to their markets out of solidarity with the Palestinian struggle for independence, which
has serious ramifications for the political and economic future of the Arab world." MTDP, supra note
129, at 204, 215-19. This is not to suggest Arab countries do not aid the Palestinian cause. Rather, it is
asserted that the support of Arab countries is limited, and insufficient (not to mention unlikely in more
moderate countries) to enforce a land regime lacking private property rights. The Organization of the
Islamic Conference, for instance, has launched programs "in support of the heroic uprising of the
Palestinian people in Occupied Palestinian Territories." See, e.g., The Final Communique of the First
Islamic Conference of Information Ministers, available at http://www.oic-
oci.org/english/info/l/Ist%20info-min-con.htm.
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manifests itself violently. Cognizant of the steady weakening of the
institutions of Palestinian governance,' 98 the PNA should be making efforts
to bolster its control by gaining the good favor of its citizens.
Fundamentalist factions, which do not recognize the PNA's authority, 199
already threaten the nation's survival by "deliberately creating havoc in
Gaza. "2°° In addition, Israel explicitly reserved its right to self-defense after
disengaging. That right might justify a renewed occupation if the PNA is
unable to control the population.
B. DEFINITE EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY RIGHTS
Laws securing private property rights are the cornerstone of a healthy
economy, and in their absence the Gaza Strip is suffering through economic
decline and stagnation. By 2003, the unemployment rate in Gaza reached
fifty percent. 2° 1 In 2005, more than six hundred thousand Palestinians were
unable to afford their basic needs for survival.' At the present time, almost
half the Palestinian population is living below the official poverty line.2 3
Absent investment, the Palestinians will be hard pressed to stimulate
economic growth. Without legally enforceable exclusive private property
rights, investors are reluctant to supply funds.
The PNA is not oblivious to these facts. Realization of the MTDP
depends largely on foreign investment,2 and foreign investors have asked
the PNAto "establish clear and public mechanisms for determining property
198 See MTDP, supra note 129, at 36-38 (describing the factors weakening the institutions of
Palestinian self governance, and the measures that must be taken to strengthen and reform the
Palestinian Authority).
199 Hamas demands the establishment of a "high authority" to represent the interests of
Palestinians living in Palestine, and the interests of Palestinians living abroad. See Berman, supra note
153 (quoting Mahmoud A-Zahhar's, the leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip, answer in the negative when
asked if he considered the Palestinian Legislative Council as the high authority).
2W Palestinian Police Chief: The Palestinian Authority is a Leaky Boat, DEBKAf!e Special Report, Oct.
16,2005, httpV/www.debka.com/article-print.php?aid-- 1097 (quotingthe Palestinian Police ChiefGen.
Ala Husseini's Oct. 12, 2005 address to Palestinian police and security commanders).
201 MTDP, supra note 129, at 252.
2 Id. at 200.
2 Id.
24 The very first page of the MTDP's foreword speaks of the Ministry of Planning's "Socio-
Economic Stabilization Plan" as follows: "[it was developed] in an attempt to steer donor assistance
towards meeting a set of PNA priorities that would help bring about some stabilization in the
deteriorating social and economic environment." Additionally, the MTDP's framework for Palestinian
socio-economic development includes detailed schedules of foreign investments the Palestinian
Authority still requires, as well as those already acquired, to implement the MTDP. Id. at 128.
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rights."20 At that time, the Palestinian Government was already aware of the
importance of precise definition. In the MTDP, the PNA reasoned the
"well defined" borders of the Gaza governorate made it "the most suitable
geographic unit that could be practically used for developing guidelines for
the spatial distribution of projects and programs."' Additionally, the PNA
charged the Israeli government with issuing a disengagement plan too
ambiguous for the PNA to comfortably prepare for.7 Given these facts,
one can only wonder why "modernizing the legal system" is addressed in
two paltry paragraphs of the 272 page MTDP,m which later states that "[f] or
the most part . . . existing laws and the Palestinian judicial system are
sufficiently capable of processing [land] claims." 2°9
Fashioned by fellow Muslims, the Ottoman Land Code was not enacted
in order to deprive Palestinians of their property. The Code's unanticipated
adverse impact proves existing law is flawed. If the rules describing matruka
and mewat were more clearly defined, they would not have been so easily
circumvented. Opportunities seized by occupiers to enact rules like the
British Mewat Land Ordinance may have been foreclosed if the Code, in
general, was more fully developed. What little protection the 1907 Hague
Regulations afforded Palestinian property interests was not because of the
205 The Palestinian Authority enlisted the help of the World Bank to identify those "aspects of
the legal system that have a bearing on the economy," and to reform them. Id. at 219. In December 2004,
when USAID, the funding arm of the United States Government, proposed a plan for the use of the
greenhouses in the evacuated Gush Katifsettlements, the World Bank performed a study of the situation.
After the settlement property is transferred to the Palestinians, the study determined that the question
of property ownership is a crucial undecided issue that must be resolved before progressing with the
USAID plan. Early on, the World Bank noted the discrepancies in titles to Palestinian property, and
recommended the following: "the Authority establish clear and public mechanisms for determining
property rights, and then either return the lands or offer owners compensation." Charmaine Seitz,
USAID Proposes Palestinian Company 'Caretaker' for Gush Katif Lands, WORLDPRESS.ORG, Feb. 25, 2005,
httpV/www.worldpress.org/printarticle.cfm?article id=2155&dont=yes. Ayear after the World Bank's
study, which warned the Palestinian Authority that progress was not possible if property rights were not
settled, the MTDP, which elaborates on investments needed for its implementation down to the last
dollar and percentage, was issued, devoting but one sentence to property rights specifically: "To facilitate
an optimal use of resources, property rights should be well defined." See MTDP, supra note 129, at 219.
M6 The precise definition of the governorates' borders was one of six main reasons for adopting
them as the geographic units for spatial analyses. MTDP, supra note 129, at 225.
W 'The ambiguity of the 'disengagement' plans published by Israel makes planning for these
areas difficult. In the plans, the extent and scope of Palestinian access to and control of evacuated land
is unclear. In the West Bank, the geographical delimitation ofthe area referred to in the 'disengagement
plan' is poorly defined and several terms for describing the area are applied. Important concepts
including "territorial continuity," "evacuated area" and "continuous transport" remain subject to
interpretation." Id. at 42; see also id. at 247-49.
M8 Id. at 219.
N Id. at 245.
44 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REV1IEW [Vol. 15:1
Regulations' requirement that pre-occupation law be enforced. It was the
Regulations' specific prohibition of private property appropriations absent
just cause that proved difficult to contravene.
Laws, although subject to interpretation, should only be interpreted
within reason. Despite the PNA's rise to power, it is clear Shari'a is still
being manipulated. Palestinians are the perpetual targets of what American
jurisprudence refers to as "due process violations," without the benefit of a
"rule of lenity" resolving ambiguities in their favor. They can, however,
bring the vicious cycle to a close by joining the ranks of moderate Muslims
regulating the interpretation of Islam.21
The Organization of the Islamic Conference, for example, recently
issued a ruling which both recognized intellectual property rights in Islamic
law and ascribed a monetary value to such rights.21' The ruling underscores
the potential for expansion of individual property rights in Islamic law
through interpretation of legal terms of art such as mal (wealth or property),
which is now understood to include intellectual property. The Advanced
Legal Studies Institute identified the nature of ownership (milkiyyah), and
the nature and meaning of possession (milk al-yad), as additional concepts in
need of definition.1 2
CONCLUSION
Whereas the written word is static, society is not. The Gaza Strip is no
longer a sparsely populated stretch of indescript territory dotting the rural
landscape of ancient Palestine. Islam's early architects were not faced with
the present day global market. Blind to the forces of evolution,
fundamentalists are ultimately waging war against themselves. There is no
210 Kourides has identified four main approaches to reform: "(1) the eclectic technique in
providing a synthesis of Islamic and Western legal provisions; (2) the use of procedural devices for
confining the jurisdiction ofshari'a courts; (3) the complete reinterpretation of the authoritative texts in
the light of present day needs; and (4) overlapping with the first three, the use of legislative enactments
to make changesjustified bythe doctrines ofsiyasa and maslahah. P. Nicholas Kourides, Traditionalism and
Modernism in Islamic Law: a Review, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 491 (1972) (describing the legal
evolution of countries that embrace Shari'a).
211 Islamic Law of Property and Ownership, Advanced Legal Studies Institute, http'//www.nyazee
.con/islaw/property/property.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2006); see also Bureau for Arab Countries,
Cooperation with Other Organizations, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/arab/en/cooperation/organizations
.html?printable=true (last visited Sept. 28, 2006) ("WIPO signed a Cooperation Agreement with the
Organization of the Islamic Conference on December 10, 2003 in Geneva. The agreement includes the
invitation to each institution conferences as well as the joint cooperation in the promotion of intellectual
property for each respective institution member states").
212 Islamic Law of Property and Ownership, supra note 211.
RIGHT OF RETURN
time like now, the early stages of nation building, for the Palestinians to take
corrective action.
Violence is clearly the wrong course of action. Israel's newest political
party, the Kadima Party, included support for "the establishment of a
Palestinian state alongside Israel" as one of its main principles. 213 Why
jeopardize the potential of a fresh Middle Eastern order ripe with
opportunity for Palestinian self governance and prosperity? Effectively
reforming the legal system will improve both Gaza's prospects and the
prospects of its citizens. On a larger scale, reforming Shari'a will also benefit
the entire Muslim world fiercely dear to Palestinians. As noted by
Abdulssalam Al-Abadi, Jordan's former Religious Affairs Minister,
"[Muslims] cannot keep having two versions of Islam: the correct and
moderate views and the violent and extremists views. It's tearing apart the
faith."214 So, even a Muslim authority agrees, fix the faith before history
repeats itself
213 New Israeli Party Lays Out Principles: Sharon's Kadima Meets, Endorses Peaceful Palestinian State,
CNN.coM, Nov. 28, 2005, available at httpJ/www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/11/28/israel.politics/;
See also Jonathan Ferziger, Barak Says Israel Should Leave West Bank Unilaterally, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct.
31,2005, available at httpV/www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid = 71000001&refer =&sid + aI3L.QAL4Y5c
(describing former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's position in favor of withdrawal from the West
Bank, another example of the potential shift in Israeli politics for the Palestinians' benefit).
214 Murphy, supra note 170.
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